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I. INTRODUCTION 
Words are the prototypical regulatory subjects for trademark 
and advertising law, despite our increasingly audiovisual 
economy. This word-focused baseline means that the Lanham Act 
often misconceives its object, resulting in confusion and 
incoherence. This Article explores some of the ways courts have 
attempted to fit images into a word-centric model, while not fully 
recognizing the particular ways in which images make meaning. 
As I have explored in other work, images have a complex 
relationship to truth, reality, and deception, especially in the 
law.1 Western culture associates images with truth, but also with 
emotion and, therefore, with dangerous subjectivity.2 The law 
often regards words as relatively more stable: however 
ambiguous language may be, images are worse.3 This oscillation 
between special access to truth and special danger of distracting 
from rational judgment leads law to treat images inconsistently. 
I will focus throughout this Article on representational 
images because those are what the relevant cases are about, and 
because this allows fruitful comparisons between the treatment 
of words and images, both of which are generally taken to stand 
                                            
 1. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright Law, 
125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2012) (manuscript at 418), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911352 (exploring the use of images 
in law and the interplay between the truth value of images, the relationship of images to 
reality, and images ability to deceive). 
 2. See, e.g., Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction, in LAW AND THE IMAGE: 
THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 1, 7 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda 
Nead eds., 1999) (The history of laws attitude toward images follows this tortuous 
dialectic, the deeply paradoxical combination of truth and falsity, of blindness and insight. 
The claim that image is truth implicates the theme of resemblance, similarity, or 
mimesis, a key metaphysical concept of Western philosophy. . . . But image is also 
false. . . . Images are sensual and fleshy; they address the labile elements of the self, 
they speak to the emotions, and they organize the unconscious. They have the power 
to short-circuit reason and enter the soul without the interpolation or intervention of 
language or interpretation.); Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on 
the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609, 616 (2004) 
([A]ttitudes toward [vision and visuality] have rarely been unambiguous. . . . Statements 
such as Seeing is believing, and A picture is worth a thousand words indicate the value 
our culture places on vision, but there also exists a distinct countervailing notion that 
images can be deceptive and misleading. These concerns are particularly strong in the 
legal culture, where certainty and reliability are paramount. (footnotes omitted)). 
 3. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009) (stating 
that nontextual monuments are less susceptible to stable interpretation than monuments 
using words); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973) (A book seems to have a 
different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values [than an image], and so it should 
be.). 
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for (represent) some idea, entity, or the like. Only that which is 
representational can misrepresent and thus become a subject of 
advertising laws concern for truthfulness. In the case of 
trademark law in particular, only when an image is or becomes 
representationalacquires secondary meaning in the language of 
trademarkcan it be protected as a mark; by definition, a 
trademark is an indicator of source.4 In this sense, even colors 
can be representational, as when people associate a certain shade 
of blue with the jeweler Tiffany. Color can represent other things 
as well, as this Article will discuss with respect to cigarettes. 
By surveying both trademark and general advertising law, I 
hope to show that images present deep challenges both to the 
definition of protected rights under the Lanham Act (mostly a 
concern of its trademark side) and to the determination of when a 
defendant has violated the law (where false advertising law 
focuses most of its energy). 
Two points are worth making at the outset. First, the 
argument here is mainly critical. Its standard in legal 
scholarship to offer proposals to improve whatever legal defect 
one has identified, but some problems are very hard to solve. I 
would no more claim to have the answer to the problem of images 
in law than I would claim to resolve the rules versus standards 
debate. In identifying patterns, calling out inconsistencies, and 
finding dilemmas that will likely always remain difficult, I aim 
instead to encourage reflection, epistemic humility, and the 
creative use of images themselves to deal with problems caused 
by images. Sometimes we simply need to remind ourselves that a 
problem hasnt been solved, or that its not the same problem as 
one we thought solved. 
Second, this Article deals with trademark and general 
advertising law together because the two are, in concept and in 
history, fundamentally linked. Trademark claimants often prefer 
that we forget this and have in recent years been quite successful 
in convincing courts to ignore the link.5 Nonetheless, trademark 
                                            
 4. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§§ 3:13:3, at 3-2 to -8, § 15:1, at 15-5 (4th ed. 2011). 
5.  See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal 
Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 131213 (2011) 
(arguing for a return to convergence between the two branches of the Lanham Act); 
see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008) (refusing to 
apply the same legal standards for infringement and false advertising because doing 
so would muddle the two separate bodies of law that have developed under the 
Lanham Act); Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A 
Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 6970 
(1996) (discussing how the recognition of false advertising laws as distinct under the 
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infringementconfusion over sourceis a kind of false advertising. 
Its a false representation about a product attribute, in this case its 
source or sponsorship.6 Other kinds of false representations in 
commerce are known more generally as false advertising.7 
The Lanham Act recognizes this basic connection in the core 
language of section 1125, which bars the use of any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or 
false or misleading representation of fact, which either is likely 
to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of [the defendant] with another person, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities (trademark) or misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another persons goods, services, or commercial activities (false 
advertising generally).8 State unfair competition statutes 
generally have similar scope.9 Thus, to understand trademark, 
its useful to pay attention to the rest of false advertising law, 
and vice versa. Unfortunately, much of the relevant literature 
treats intellectual property as a separate topic instead of 
looking at the Lanham Act as a whole.10 This property frame 
distracts legal analysis from the actual language of the governing 
statute and from the history of trademark infringement as a 
wrong done by one competitor to another.11 
The legal congruence between trademark and other forms of 
advertising law has its basis in nonlegal reality: trademarks 
                                            
Lanham Act provides claimants with protection that extends beyond trademark 
infringement). 
6.  Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 
445 (2010). 
7.  Id. at 444. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
9.  See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts 
Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 17072 (2011) (summarizing the varieties of 
uniform and model statutes, adopted by numerous states, which cover trademark 
infringement specifically, along with other specified types of false advertising, or which 
bar all deceptive commercial practices in general). 
 10.  See, e.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising 
Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 809 (1999) (Litigation under [the Lanham 
Act] differs significantly from intellectual property and antitrust cases . . . .); Tushnet, 
supra note 5, at 130913 (proposing the reunification of trademark law and false 
advertising law due to their fundamental similarities as regulations of how advertisers 
communicate messages to consumers). 
 11.  See generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 184448 (2007) (recounting the conventional wisdom 
of trademark law and describing its purpose as protect[ing] producers from illegitimate 
attempts to divert their trade). 
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identify and promote products and services. Trademarks are, like 
other kinds of marketing, ultimately a way of getting consumers 
to buy things. Dilution law, which is supposed to protect the 
selling power of a mark,12 is the most naked legal recognition of 
this marketing function, but ordinary protection and 
infringement rulings are ultimately about the ways in which 
trademark owners, and other people, will be allowed to sell their 
products. Lawyers may treat trademark as a unique category of 
marketing communications (at the same time as they assert that 
trademark protection applies to every possible form of such 
marketing), but marketers dont, nor should they rationally do so 
if the goal is, as they tell us, to improve sales and brand value.13  
To the extent that trademark law creates value that exists 
only because of legal protection or encourages trademark owners 
to make legal claims that dont reflect marketplace realities, 
trademark law is distorting markets rather than facilitating 
them. Thus, in trademark cases, we should remember the 
ultimate advertising function of trademarks and draw on what 
marketers know, rather than continuing to allow trademark to 
metastasize in isolation from the rest of advertising law. 
I can offer no easy solutions to the problems identified in 
this Article because images aredespite our hopesprotean. I 
urge judges and lawyers to be careful when thinking about 
images so that we do not too easily move between treating 
images as perfectly transparent and understandable to treating 
images as opaque and ungovernable, as it suits our immediate 
purposes. 
II. TRADEMARK 
A. Formal Word Primacy and the Incoherence of the 
Abercrombie Spectrum 
Trademark law has, since its inception, covered both words 
and images. But as trademark doctrine emerged from general 
                                            
 12.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995) 
(explaining the selling power theory of dilution). 
 13.  Legal scholars are beginning to explore the ways in which trademark law 
overlaps with brand theory in some ways and misses the mark in others. See, e.g., Laura 
R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1227, 124043, 127172, 1278 (2008) (discussing the informational purposes of both 
trademark law and brands and the relationship between trademark dilution law and 
brand value); Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 
BYU L. REV. 1425, 143540 (arguing that [t]rademark law is quite naïve or at best 
myopic in how it accounts for the way in which brands function, and as a result, the law 
must understand brands better). 
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unfair competition law and became more doctrinally complex 
through the twentieth century, it took words as its prototypes, 
perhaps because judges are familiar with words and comfortable 
with analyzing them legally.14 That trademarks model is words is 
most apparent in what is known as the Abercrombie spectrum, 
a system for categorizing words to figure out if, and under what 
circumstances, they can be protected as trademarks.15 Generic 
words define a class of things (e.g., the fruits known as apples) 
and cannot be protected as marks for those things at all.16 
Descriptive words are just that (e.g., tasty apples), conveying an 
immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of 
the things described. Descriptive terms can only be protected as 
marks if consumers come to associate them with a particular 
source (e.g., American Airlines).17 Suggestive terms require more 
imagination and thought than descriptive terms to figure out the 
relationship between the thing being sold and the word (e.g., 
Penguin for freezers). Suggestive, arbitrary (no obvious relation 
to the thing at all), and fanciful (made up) terms can all be 
protected as trademarks as soon as the user adopts them for its 
goods or services; there is no need to wait for secondary 
meaning.18 
Trademark law has struggled to fit nonword marks into the 
Abercrombie spectrum and has failed to offer any particularly 
well-formed alternatives to the spectrum for images or other 
nonverbal symbols that might indicate source,19 with the partial 
exception of product packaging trade dress.20 Courts have 
                                            
 14. See McKenna, supra note 11, at 184953, 18991915 (providing a detailed 
account of the history of trademark law). 
 15. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 911 (2d Cir. 
1976) (describing four categories of terms for purposes of determining the level of 
trademark protection afforded to the term); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress Protection for 
Product Configurations: Is There a Conflict with Patent Policy?, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427, 47677 
(1996) (discussing the Abercombie tests applicability in the context of trade dress). 
 16. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 12:1, at 12-4 to -5. 
 17. Id. § 11:15, at 11-23 to -24, § 15:1, at 15-5 to -7. 
 18. Id. § 11:4, § 15:1.50, at 15-9. 
 19. See Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 79 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 384, 394!96, 
399!400, 403!07 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Courts and commentators have held . . . that the 
Abercrombie test was developed and applied in reference to word marks, and that in many 
cases it may not apply to other marks consisting of color schemes, symbols, or geometric 
shapes.); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 11:2, at 11-7 (Use of the spectrum of descriptive, 
suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful is largely confined to word marks. It is usually not 
suitable for nonword designations such as shapes and images making up trade dress. 
Whether trade dress is inherently distinctive or not must be judged by other guidelines.). 
 20. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 8:13, at 8-58.7 to -58.12 (explaining that 
several different tests ha[ve] been used to determine whether packaging trade dress [is] 
inherently distinctive). An inherently distinctive product package must be unique, 
unusual, or unexpected in this market [such] that one can assume without proof that it 
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generally been willing to hold that images that illustrate some 
aspect of the products with which they are associated are 
descriptive, but without much use for Abercrombies other 
categories.21 When they decide that an image is not descriptive 
and is therefore inherently distinctive, they tend to use the terms 
arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive interchangeably, thus, in 
practice applying a binary rule that images are either descriptive 
or inherently distinctive.22 
Why does trademark have a well-developed system for 
categorizing words compared to images? Perhaps words are 
simply easier for lawyers to think about in multiple, finely 
differentiated categories, abstracted from messy reality. Thus, for 
example, realistic images of naked bodies or body parts may be 
deemed scandalous and refused registration as marks.23 By 
contrast, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is likely to 
deem the ordinary words for describing those same body parts to 
be acceptable, and only highly vulgar synonyms will be denied 
registration.24 Words can be more distanced from reality and less 
revealing or threatening than an image of a body part, so the 
PTO is more likely to conclude that the latter is inherently likely 
to offend. 
In the case of the Abercrombie spectrum, the relative 
distance of words from the real makes them more available to 
                                            
will automatically be perceived by consumers as an indicator of origin. Fiji Water Co. v. 
Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, courts consider: 
[(1)] whether [the design is] a common basic shape or design, [(2)] whether it 
[is] unique or unusual in a particular field, [(3)] whether it [is] a mere 
refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a 
particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the 
goods, or [(4)] whether it [is] capable of creating a commercial impression 
distinct from the accompanying words. 
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977) 
(footnotes omitted). Interestingly, Seabrook, though generally applied in trade dress 
cases, is itself about a design mark that combines words and images. Id. at 134344. 
 21. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 7:36, at 7-92 to -93 (discussing various cases in 
which pictures were held to fall within Abercrombies descriptive classification if the 
pictures conveyed what the product was, showed results from product use, or illustrated 
product use). 
 22. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 7:36, at 7-92 to -95 (discussing various cases 
and examples in order to contrast descriptive designs, symbols, and pictures with 
arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive designs, symbols, and pictures). 
 23. Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks that May 
Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1516 (2011). 
 24. See id. at 151415 (discussing registrations of Libido, Weekend Sex, Happy 
Penis, On the Wrong End of the Penis, Bountiful Breast, and Home of the Bigger 
Breast in contrast to rejections for Bubby Trap, The Bearded Clam, Pussy, Twatty 
Girl, and others). 
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appropriation for private ownership.25 The law treats suggestive, 
arbitrary, and fanciful terms as interchangeable: not tied 
particularly tightly to the things they are used to identify.26 
Competitors thus lose nothing in particular if barred from using 
those words. And yet, outside the thesaurus, that is hardly to be 
expected. Connotations can be as or more powerful than 
denotations: think of Coppertone for suntan oil, Wrangler for 
Western-style clothing and boots, or Gung-Ho for action dolls.27 
A suggestive (or arbitrary or fanciful) mark gets more legal 
protection than a descriptive mark in a variety of ways: it is 
immediately protectable against competitors (and perhaps 
others), while a descriptive mark is free for competitors to use 
unless the claimant shows secondary meaning.28 A descriptive 
mark, even if protected as a trademark, is also fair game for 
descriptive fair use, meaning that the owner of the trademark 
for Tasty Apples cant prevent competitors from describing their 
apples as tasty.29 Many courts also hold that the fact that a mark 
is suggestive gives it greater conceptual strength, a factor that 
favors a plaintiff in a confusion case.30 Imagination is the key line 
between the descriptive and the suggestive, arbitrary, or 
fanciful.31 
So much for the doctrine. But does it make sense of the way 
that consumers actually perceive things? One way of looking at 
                                            
 25. See supra notes 1718 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 
1976) (describing suggestive marks as requiring imagination to identify the associated 
goods and stating that fanciful and arbitrary marks have all the same legal rights as 
suggestive marks). 
 27. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 11:72, at 11-195 to -204 (listing various marks 
deemed suggestive). 
 28. Id. § 11:25, at 11-64 to -67, § 15:1.50, at 15-9 to -10. 
 29. See, e.g., Henris Food Prods. Co. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 130607 
(7th Cir. 1987) (noting that even when a descriptive mark, such as tasty salad dressing, 
has acquired secondary meaning and is thus registerable as a trademark, a competitor 
can use the description [tasty] in a purely descriptive manner or in its primary sense). 
 30. See, e.g., A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victorias Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 
22122 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a marks classification is a useful way to measure 
its conceptual strength); Brookfield Commcns v. W. Coast Entmt Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that one determinant of strength is placement along the 
distinctiveness spectrum). 
 31. See, e.g., George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entmt Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 394 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (Distinguishing between a suggestive mark and descriptive mark can be 
difficult. However, if the mark imparts information directly, it is descriptive, but [i]f it 
stands for an idea which requires some operation of the imagination to connect it with the 
goods, it is suggestive. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Gift of Learning Found., Inc. v. TGC, Inc., 329 F.3d 792, 79798 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (defining suggestive marks as requir[ing] an effort of the imagination by the 
consumer in order to be understood as descriptive). 
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the question is to ask how advertising researchers think about 
imagination (recall that imagination is the dividing line between 
descriptive and suggestive terms and, thus, between immediately 
protectable and possibly unprotectable terms). It turns out that 
advertising experts think about vividness instead of 
descriptiveness and suggestiveness.32 Vivid ads are better than 
bland ones when consumers are not highly motivated to make 
analytical decisions, which is most of the time. Vividness can be 
produced not just by images, but also by vivid and concrete 
language, which can stimulate consumers to create their own 
imagery.33 Secondary meaning may provide an independent 
source of vividness, triggering our memories of Coca-Cola-enhanced 
picnics and the like, but descriptive terms without secondary 
meaning (e.g., juicy for orange juice) play a substantial role in 
the general advertising literature about vividness, and that 
literature has nothing like the Abercrombie spectrum. 
Advertising researchers tend to define vivid language as 
language that is emotionally interesting, . . . concrete and 
imagery-provoking, and . . . proximate in a sensory, temporal, or 
spatial way.34 If anything, the vividness literature suggests, 
                                            
 32. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45 (1980) (stating that vivid information excites the 
imagination); Laurie A. Babin & Alvin C. Burns, Effects of Print Ad Pictures and Copy 
Containing Instructions to Imagine on Mental Imagery That Mediates Attitudes, 26 J. 
ADVERT. 33, 3637 (1997) (studying vividness by giving subjects imagine-instructions and 
measuring the clarity of the image the subject imagined); Ann L. McGill & Punam Anand, 
The Effect of Vivid Attributes on the Evaluation of Alternatives: The Role of Differential 
Attention and Cognitive Elaboration, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 188, 188, 190 (1989) (equating 
imageability to vividness). 
 33. See Elizabeth Cowley & Eunika Janus, Not Necessarily Better, but Certainly 
Different: A Limit to the Advertising Misinformation Effect on Memory, 31 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 229, 230 (2004) (describing a study in which vivid advertising language instructing 
consumers to imagine the product create[d] memories at least as vivid as memory for an 
actual experience); Daniel I. Padberg, Non-Use Benefits of Mandatory Consumer 
Information Programs, 1 J. CONSUMER POLY 5, 611 (1977) (discussing how increased 
product information availability did not have a large effect on consumers purchase 
decisions, and discussing how consumers did not use the new product information 
provided to them); Petia K. Petrova & Robert B. Cialdini, Fluency of Consumption 
Imagery and the Backfire Effects of Imagery Appeals, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 442, 443 
(2005) ([T]he vividness of the product attributes had an impact on product evaluations 
when participants relied on their imagination in making the choice but not when they 
used an analytical strategy.). 
 34. Petrova & Cialdini, supra note 33, at 443 (quoting NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 
32, at 45). Some studies define vividness implicitly. For example, in one study, the vivid 
language spoke of a cars sporty yet elegant styling and high tech interior design, 
while the nonvivid language included below average dealer service. McGill & Anand, 
supra note 32, at 19091. Vividness has also been measured by asking consumers how 
easy it was to visualize the thing described by the language at issue. Id. at 190; Babin  
& Burns, supra note 32, at 3637. 
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unfamiliar fanciful words are likely to be unhelpful as marks if 
they dont trigger any imagery in consumers minds.35 The 
Abercrombie theory is that fanciful words work really well as 
indicators of source.36 But if you have no reason to connect the 
terms Mxyzptlk or Xalatan to anything in particular, youll 
probably just forget them. A term a consumer cant remember is 
by definition not doing a good job as an indicator of source and, 
thus, cant serve the functions we attribute to trademarks of 
protecting consumers from confusion and incentivizing producers 
to maintain quality.37 Sufficiently meaningless terms might not 
even be recognized the next time the consumer sees them, at 
least not until the producer teaches the consumer their 
meaning. 
One could argue that consumers are likely to recognize that 
theyve seen even a meaningless (fanciful) mark before in 
connection with goods or services, andmore significantly for 
trademarks purposesthat they might be confused by a 
sufficiently similar term that was also meaningless to them. This 
would justify granting immediate protection to fanciful terms 
and possibly even to arbitrary terms, though it would do little to 
justify the descriptive/suggestive divide. Its true that, in some 
cases, mere exposure can improve consumers attitudes towards a 
brand,38 suggesting some subconscious learning, but the mere 
exposure research involves contexts where subjects were paying 
at least some attention, not trying to avoid ads as we so often 
do.39 
Given that significant numbers of ads make no mental 
impression whatsoever, according to scans of consumers brains,40 
                                            
 35. See Deborah J. MacInnis & Linda L. Price, The Role of Imagery in Information 
Processing: Review and Extensions, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 473, 479 (1987) (finding that 
familiarity with a brand is used by consumers to fill in missing information when the 
consumer is processing imagery as part of a product selection decision). 
 36. Antonio L. Sequeira, Note, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 251, 254 (2001). 
 37. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 2-4, § 2:3, at 2-5. 
 38.  Bradford, supra note 13, at 126567; see also Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 127880 (2011) (explaining the importance of familiarity and 
repetition of exposure in developing brand awareness). 
 39. See Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of 
Research, 19681987, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 265, 26567 (1989) (describing laboratory-based 
mere exposure studies). 
 40. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and 
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 547 (2008) ([N]ew neuroscience studies provide 
evidence for advertisers long-held belief that much advertising is completely useless. In 
MRI studies, a third to a half of commercials do not generate any brain reaction at all. 
(quoting Kenneth Chang, Enlisting Sciences Lessons to Entice More Shoppers to Spend 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at F3)). 
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we should not assume that exposure alone is enough to create 
meaning worth protecting. Moreover, the mere exposure research 
does not test whether such subconsciously familiar consumers 
have the same positive reaction to a similar-but-not-the-same 
meaningless termagain, the usual relevant inquiry in a 
trademark case.41 Nor does the research reveal whether 
consumers seeing a similar mark will be confused, since having a 
positive reaction to something that seems familiar is not the 
same thing as being confused any more than having a positive 
reaction to a laudatory descriptive term is being confused.42 As 
Mark McKenna has argued, the harm stories trademark owners 
tell have been encoded into law far beyond their actual empirical 
plausibility in any particular case.43 If interrogated, rather than 
recited, such harm stories would find it hard to survive current 
evidentiary standards for proving causation,44 and this is equally 
true when potential harm is theorized as a reason for granting 
protection to a mark without evidence of secondary meaning. 
The Abercrombie spectrum is just not that helpful as a 
heuristic for when consumers are likely to recognize an 
indication of source. Indeed, empirical research has found that 
consumers react much more strongly to visual cues for word 
markshow theyre placed on a product to signal that they are 
marksthan to the supposed differences between arbitrary, 
fanciful, suggestive, and descriptive words.45 Likewise, careful 
advertisers can manipulate the Abercrombie spectrum to couple 
use of existing meaning with a legal categorization of inherent 
distinctiveness. Consider Viagra: with its suggestions of virility, 
viability, and Niagara Falls (a classic sexual image),46 this 
                                            
 41. Cf. Bornstein, supra note 39, at 26568 (chronicling more than two decades of 
mere exposure research involving the self reporting of the effects of various stimuli on test 
subjects). 
 42. Cf. id. 
 43. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Laws Theory of Harm, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 63, 83 (2009) ([R]ecent research casts serious doubt on a number of the 
assumptions on which the arguments [regarding the harm of confusion] were based.). 
 44. See id. at 8492, 97115 (explaining that justifications for trademark protection 
have been accepted by courts and commentators even though the justifications were based 
on untested assumptions and current studies do not support them). 
 45. Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical and 
Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 
107880, 109091, 109599 (2009). 
 46. See, e.g., JOHN EMSLEY, VANITY, VITALITY, AND VIRILITY: THE SCIENCE BEHIND 
THE PRODUCTS YOU LOVE TO BUY 88 (2004) (Clearly, the drug needed to be marketed 
under a sexy name and the result was Viagra, instantly memorable and, no doubt, its 
rhyming association with Niagara helped.); A Weird Science Used in Naming Drugs, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 21, 2008 (Viagra evokes the power of Niagara Falls. I think Viagra really hits 
the bull's-eye on virility, [a marketing expert] said.). 
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ostensibly fanciful mark47 started out primed to generate 
extremely useful imagery for a drug designed to give men 
erections. Drug makers, like other advertisers, strongly prefer 
terms that are easier to remember and that means words that 
already have or suggest a meaning to consumers, jump-starting 
their secondary meaning.48 
Why are marketing knowledge and legal doctrine so far 
apart? Why spend so much energy on words, only to create 
artificial categories for them? Again, it may be important that 
words seem easier to categorize than other forms of 
communication, even when the categories lack empirical 
foundation. Ann Bartow has pointed out that, from an ex ante 
perspective, words can seem more predictable and manageable 
for the average trademark owner.49 Even those who register 
trademarks in colors or other nontraditional marks almost 
invariably use word marks prominently as well.50 As Ill discuss 
further with respect to trade dress in Part II.D, words can give a 
trademark owner more confidence about what, exactly, it owns. 
Having categories of inherently distinctive words is 
particularly useful because advertisers can be sure they have 
exclusive rights to such marks without waiting to see whether 
secondary meaning develops among the public.51 The United 
States has even adopted an intent-to-use system that allows 
registration of inherently distinctive marks before use, further 
enhancing commercial predictability.52 
                                            
 47. See Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 48. A Weird Science Used in Naming Drugs, supra note 46. 
 49. See Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide 
of Anti Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 265 (2009) (explaining that trademark owners 
can transmit and recreate words with a high degree of faithfulness). 
 50. See id. at 267 (Mark holders typically use word marks in tandem with colors 
because language facilitates certainty in ways that are useful for commerce. Color marks 
are secondary and generally play supporting roles to dominant textual marks.). 
 51. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 15:1.50, at 15-9 (Inherently distinctive 
marks . . . are irrebuttably presumed to have achieved customer recognition and 
association immediately upon adoption and use.). 
 52. See In re Rogers, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1741, 174445 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (explaining the 
requirements to transfer a marks previously acquired distinctiveness as to certain goods 
or services to the goods or services in the intent-to-use application). An intent-to-use 
application (ITU) can only be approved for registration if the mark is distinctive for the 
goods and services. Id. at 1744. Since an ITU by definition doesnt require use, its 
generally inappropriate for terms that would require secondary meaning developed 
through use in commerce to function as marks. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.09(a), at 1200-336 (7th ed. Rev. 1, 
Oct. 2010) [hereinafter TMEP] (A claim of distinctiveness . . . is normally not filed in a[n] 
[ITU] application before the applicant files an amendment to allege use or a statement of 
use, because a claim of acquired distinctiveness, by definition, requires prior use.); Amy 
B. Cohen, Intent to Use: A Failed Experiment?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 683, 691 (2001) (noting 
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Images enter into this legal system, not exactly as an 
afterthought, but as a category in need of discipline through 
words. Registration for trademarks, unlike that for copyrights, 
involves entry into a detailed classification scheme and, 
therefore, requires all marks to be described in words, at least in 
part.53 Thus, the PTOs Trademark Design Search Code Manual 
classifies images according to various and often haphazard 
categories: one class for images of men includes images of 
merchants, other store clerks and men in aprons, excluding 
butchers, chefs and bakers wearing aprons.54 This attempt to 
discipline all visual perception through words is funny, in part 
because of its obvious insufficiency. (The similarity to Borgess 
categories of animals is doubtless unintentional, but real.)55 The 
PTOs Manual might help identify some marks that are similar 
to each other, but it will miss plenty of others; its searchability 
will always be limited as long as it translates images into words. 
But the PTO uses words because the law uses words and because 
search engines are not yet good enough to understand how people 
see similarities without making use of the words people have 
associated with those images. 
 All this prompts the question: should the Abercrombie 
spectrum be abandoned? We do need mechanisms for determining 
when we should be reluctant to protect certain terms because 
                                            
that ITU applications allow[ ] a party to apply for federal [trademark] registration 
without having demonstrated use). Thus, an ITU ordinarily must be inherently 
distinctive, although the PTO has developed a limited exception for cases in which the 
applicant shows that existing secondary meaning would transfer to the use described in 
the ITU. In re Rogers, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 174445; see also TMEP, supra (noting that ITUs 
generally cant be registered on grounds of acquired distinctiveness because they dont 
have any, absent the special exception for transfer of distinctiveness). 
 53. Compare Donna K. Hopkins, Searching for Graphic Content in USPTO 
Trademark Databases, 25 WORLD PAT. INFO. 107, 10708 (2003) (describing the 
trademark classification system that categorizes marks by design codes, which is 
searchable by words describing the mark), with The Copyright Card Catalog and the 
Online Files of the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 12 (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ23.pdf (describing the copyright registration system, 
which indexes copyrights by only five key elements that establish the history of any 
original registration, such as title and date of publication). 
 54. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. TRADEMARK DESIGN SEARCH CODE 
MANUAL, § 02.01.38, http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/dscm/dsc_02.htm#020138 (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2011) (formatting altered for better readability). 
 55. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, THE ANALYTICAL LANGUAGE OF JOHN WILKINS (1942), 
reprinted in OTHER INQUISITIONS: 19371952, at 101, 103 (Ruth L. C. Simms trans., 1964) 
(describing a Chinese encyclopedia that supposedly divided animals into (a) those that 
belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, 
(e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this 
classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those 
drawn with a very fine camels hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a 
flower vase, [and] (n) those that resemble flies from a distance). 
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competitors or others need to use them. We could justify some 
conceptual divisions in protection based on other producers 
interests,56 but the current justification courts give for using the 
Abercrombie spectrumthat consumers are predisposed to 
recognize some words as marks and not others57lacks empirical 
foundation and works instead as a just-so story. A branch of law 
supposedly founded on what consumers think deserves better. 
Perhaps we should leave off the fine distinctions for words as 
well as images and simply divide words into generic terms, terms 
that are protectable with secondary meaning, and terms that are 
inherently distinctive, with the presumption being that 
secondary meaning ought to be required in cases of doubt (a 
solution similar to that which the Supreme Court has already 
approved in the case of trade dress).58 The Abercrombie category 
of suggestive marks, in particular, invites lawyerly manipulation 
and inconsistent results and might ideally be abandoned.59 In any 
event, our decisions should be based on assessing competitors 
needs and consumers interests with a real appreciation for how 
consumers make meaning, rather than on a schema developed by 
judges decades before much relevant empirical work was done. 
B. On Knowing It When You See It: Visuality and Infringement  
Depending on how the law defines trademark infringement 
and dilution, rights in one image can cover multiple levels of 
abstraction. The reason for this is that trademark generally 
operates by what Jeanne Fromer calls central claiming by 
exemplar: the trademark owner offers its mark as it is used in 
commerce, which defines the core of what the trademark owner 
                                            
 56. Note that whether a term is descriptive as applied to the trademark owners products 
or services may not be an accurate guide to whether noncompetitors need to use the term to 
describe their own goods or services. Plenty of sellers of fruit-related products have a 
competitive need to use the term apple; thus, the fact that Apple is arbitrary as applied to 
computers isnt necessarily relevant. See Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 
F.3d 267, 26970 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that [defendants] use of the pine-tree shape [was] 
clearly descriptive where defendants product was a pine-scented, holiday-themed air 
freshener). 
 57. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 21213 (2000) 
(asserting that consumers are predisposed to see nondescriptive terms as marks and not 
predisposed to see descriptive terms as marks). 
 58. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding that 
inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable under the Lanham Act without a showing 
of secondary meaning). 
 59.  Cf. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 121011 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (arguing that trademark law too readily accepts terms as suggestive and 
that the standard for inherent distinctiveness should be higher). 
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owns.60 Then, in cases of alleged infringement, a fact finder 
determines whether the defendant has gotten too close to the 
plaintiffs mark.61 This can be contrasted to utility patent law, 
which largely depends on peripheral claiming by 
characteristic: the patent is defined through its claims, not 
through any particular embodiment, and an alleged infringement 
must include all the patents claims to be infringing.62 Confusing 
similarity, in terms of consumer perception of the patented 
product or process, is not part of the patent infringement test.63 
Central claiming means that even a very clearly defined 
image mark may have protection beyond what is depicted in an 
image of the mark. Its boundaries are not self-evident. Instead, 
they depend on how consumers are likely to react to variations on 
the image. Thus, Adidas has trademark rights in three stripes for 
shoes, but it successfully won a multimillion-dollar judgment 
against Payless for selling confusingly similar two-stripe and 
four-stripe shoes.64 
One can claim words centrally by exemplar as readily as one 
can claim images.65 Trademark law has, therefore, expanded 
greatly with respect to words, along with everything else, as 
courts have adopted broader concepts of actionable confusion.66 
But visual trademarks invite particular overconfidence in courts 
infringement judgments. 
Trademark law considers differences in form when assessing 
whether a particular use is infringing. Though similarity is 
                                            
 60. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009) 
(discussing central claiming by exemplar in the context of copyright and patent law). 
 61. See id. at 79596 & n.388 (discussing trademark infringement). 
 62. See TDM Am., LLC v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 761, 768 (2010) (outlining the 
all elements rule and the duty of the court to determine whether all of the claim 
limitations are present); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? 
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 174849 (2009) 
(explaining the theoretical peripheral claiming process from application to alleged 
infringement). 
 63. See Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(concluding that a likelihood of confusion finding in a product packaging design patent 
case was a misapplication of the trademark test for infringement to patent law). 
 64. Adidas-Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1083 (D. Or. 
2008); see also Adidas-Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008 WL 
4279812, at *1, *14 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008) (awarding Adidas $30,610,179 in reasonable 
royalty damages and $19.7 million in Paylesss profits). 
 65. See, e.g., Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding that the marks Forslean and Forsthin were similar in appearance and 
meaning and therefore Forslean [was] entitled to broad protection because it [was] a 
strong mark both conceptually and commercially). 
 66. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 2099, 2120, 2145, 2153 (2009) (discussing expansions in actionable confusion beyond 
sponsorships or the point of purchase to post-sale confusion). 
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generally assessed in terms of sight, sound, and meaning,67 that 
test was developed for word marks. When there are no words or 
representational images involved, the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board applies instead an eyeball test.68 The leading 
treatise explains: 
Because a picture is worth a thousand words, there is little 
in the way of guidelines to determine that degree of visual 
similarity which will cause a likelihood of confusion of 
buyers. Obviously, for picture and design marks (as opposed 
to word marks), similarity of appearance is controlling. 
There is no point in launching into a long analysis of the 
judicial pros and cons regarding visual similarity of marks. 
Regarding visual similarity, all one can say is I know it 
when I see it.69 
I know it when I see it, of course, is taken from Justice 
Potter Stewarts notorious statement about the laws inability to 
define obscenity in words.70 This is a statement about power: it is 
infringement when the fact finder sees infringement. Its also, 
therefore, necessarily a statement about unpredictability. Judges 
expect other people to see the same things they do. In reality, 
however, perception often depends on a variety of factors, 
including demographics and other things to which a person has 
recently been exposed. For example, Dan Kahan and his 
colleagues showed that different people responded to a videotape 
of a police chase in very different ways, some seeing perfectly 
acceptable police behavior and others seeing reckless 
endangerment; gender and education were important factors in 
sorting those responses.71 Even setting politicized categories 
aside, advertisers have long understood that juxtaposition 
matters. A person who sees one product at the store can react 
                                            
 67. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on 
other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 68. Retail Royalty Co. v. S.A.S.C.O. Trading Inc., Opposition No. 91173803, at 910 
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (not precedential). 
 69. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 23.25, at 23-153 to -54 (footnote omitted); see also 
id. § 23.25, at 23-153 (Similarity of appearance between marks is really nothing more 
than a subjective eyeball test.); GoTo.Com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 
(9th Cir. 2000) (With a single glance at the two images, one is immediately struck by 
their similarity.); Vertos Med., Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09-1411 PJH, 2009 WL 
3740709, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009) (echoing previous courts discussion of the eyeball 
test); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying 
the eyeball test). 
 70. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (I know 
[obscenity] when I see it.). 
 71. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 837, 868 tbl.1, 870 (2009). 
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differently to the next one, simply because of the ways in which 
her perceptions have been primed.72 
Judge Posner, one of the preeminent jurists of the past few 
decades, exemplifies how judicial confidence in assessing 
infringement persists despite its lack of empirical support. He 
advises advocates to include pictures whenever possible, and 
recounts an anecdote involving litigation between the 
Indianapolis Colts and the Baltimore CFL Colts, a franchise 
opened by the Canadian Football League in Baltimore after the 
American football team formerly in that city left for Indianapolis 
under contentious circumstances. Judge Posner said that the 
plaintiff Indianapolis Colts won its case the moment it showed 
the court two baseball caps produced by the parties, because the 
caps were identical.73 But the names were already identical. The 
CFL Colts argued that, among other things, the Indianapolis 
Colts had abandoned the Baltimore Colts mark with the city 
and that public knowledge of the very well-known split 
protected against confusion.74 The image overwhelmed the 
legal argument. 
Similarly, in a case involving brooms, Judge Posner was 
equally confident of his ability to evaluate visual appearance to 
determine whether ordinary broom consumers were likely to be 
confused.75 The ways in which visual meanings are made are 
unfamiliar to judges and, thus, often invisible. Judges 
occasionally admit expert testimony from linguists,76 but visual 
design experts are rare because the ways in which images make 
meaning are so familiar as to seem transparenteasily 
understandableeven when they work in ways that ordinary 
observers dont expect.77 
                                            
 72. See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 54748, 548 nn.19293 (examining advertisers 
long-held belief that the ad clutter present in the marketplace diminishes the 
effectiveness of certain forms of advertising). 
 73. Richard A. Posner, Effective Appellate Brief Writing, AM. B. ASSN, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/appellate-brief-writing-
posner.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2011); Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football 
Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 74. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 41112. 
 75. Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 136263 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(making his own assessment of visual similarity). 
 76. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 505 (Me. 1978) (concluding that the lower 
courts admission of expert voice identification testimony was not error); 4 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 4, § 23:92.75, at 23-33 to -34 (noting that the Trademark Board give[s] little, if 
any, weight to the expert testimony of linguists); ROGER SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN 
TRADEMARK DISPUTES 14 (2002) (advocating for the use of linguists in trademark 
litigation). 
 77. See Yamaha Intl Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 158283 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (discussing the lower courts reluctance to admit expert testimony on acquired 
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Indeterminacy and judicial overconfidence in determining 
meaning are, of course, common in every area of the law. Is there 
any reason to think matters are worse when images are 
involved? As the next section explains, I think there is. 
C. Verbal Overshadowing 
One problem that may be occurring at the decisional level 
involves a phenomenon known as verbal overshadowing.78 
Lawyers, judges, and jurors focus on definitions and verbal 
arguments, which can distort their memories and perceptions of 
the nonverbal subjects of litigation.79 Such alterations in 
perception are particularly important for Lanham Act cases, 
where questions of deception or infringement are supposed to be 
judged from the perspective of an ordinary observer.80 Because 
verbal overshadowing changes how fact finders see the world, 
it makes them less likely to reach the same results as an 
ordinary observer exposed only to the trademarks (or ads) 
would. 
The essence of verbal overshadowing is that producing 
verbal descriptions decreases the accuracy of a memory of a 
                                            
distinctiveness with regards to the shape of guitar heads and the lower courts ultimate 
decision to accord the experts only modest weight). 
 78. See, e.g., Christian A. Meissner, John C. Brigham & Colleen M. Kelley, The 
Influence of Retrieval Processes in Verbal Overshadowing, 29 MEMORY & COGNITION 176, 
176, 185 (2001) (describing verbal overshadowing, an effect where verbal description can 
have deleterious effects on later identification of a target face, and the results of a study 
on the influence of forcing participants to generate misinformation). One important 
caveat: Though many have replicated these results, the magnitude of the effect may be 
less than initially reported. Jonah Lehrer, The Truth Wears Off, NEW YORKER, Dec. 13, 
2010, at 52, 5253 (noting that Jonathan Schoolers attempts to replicate his results 
produced declining effects over time; Schooler coined the term verbal overshadowing); 
see also Chad S. Dodson, Marcia K. Johnson & Jonathan W. Schooler, The Verbal 
Overshadowing Effect: Why Descriptions Impair Face Recognition, 25 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 129, 136 (1997) (finding that face recognition suffers when subjects generate 
a description of a face they have seen); Marte Fallshore & Jonathan W. Schooler, Verbal 
Vulnerability of Perceptual Expertise, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY 
& COGNITION 1608, 1618 (1995) (finding that verbalization can disrupt peoples ability to 
apply their perceptual expertise, particularly in the context of recognizing faces outside a 
persons own race); Meissner, Brigham & Kelley, supra, at 176 (explaining that 
Schoolers verbal overshadowing findings have been replicated within the facial 
memory paradigm . . . and have been extended to other domains involving perceptual 
expertise). 
 79. See Deanne L. Westerman & Janet D. Larsen, Verbal-Overshadowing Effect: 
Evidence for a General Shift in Processing, 110 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 417, 42122, 425 (1997) 
(relaying the results of an experiment showing that verbally biased descriptions lead to 
recognition impairment). 
 80. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 62, at 1775 (outlining trademark laws analysis 
of whether an allegedly infringing mark would be considered sufficiently similar to be 
confusing to an ordinary observer). 
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nonverbal stimulus.81 Crucially, verbal overshadowing affects not 
just memory but qualitative evaluations. One study showed that 
verbalizing perceptions of a faces attractiveness shifted subjects 
ratings towards extremes: a better-than-average face became 
beautiful, and a below-average face became ugly.82 As the studys 
authors explained, when participants attempt to articulate the 
reasons for their perceptions their thoughts about the perception 
are disrupted. A shift occurs from a normal cognitive process to a 
more analytical procedure and thus affects the outcome.83 
Perhaps because images gain their persuasive power from 
operating on consumers opinions and decisions without being 
directly translated into words, the translated image actually 
conveys a different message to the observer. 
But the problem is worse than that: Other peoples descriptions 
can change subjects memories and even their sensory perceptions.84 
                                            
 81. See Maria A. Brandimonte, Jonathan W. Schooler & Patrizia Gabbino, 
Attenuating Verbal Overshadowing Through Color Retrieval Cues, 23 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 915, 927 (1997) (showing the verbal 
overshadowing effect on a persons memory of an abstract image); Joseph M. Melcher  
& Jonathan W. Schooler, The Misremembrance of Wines Past: Verbal and Perceptual 
Expertise Differentially Mediate Verbal Overshadowing of Taste Memory, 35 J. MEMORY & 
LANGUAGE 231, 23839 (1996) (finding that a persons memories relating to taste can be 
disrupted by attempts at committing it to words); Helen F. Mitchell & Raymond A. R. 
MacDonald, Linguistic Limitations of Describing Sound: Is Talking About Music Like 
Dancing About Architecture?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON 
PERFORMANCE SCIENCE 2009, at 45, 4749 (Aaron Williamon et al. eds., 2009) (reporting 
the negative effect that a verbal description has on a person attempting to correctly 
identify a target voice during a line-up); Wendy V. Parr, David Heatherbell & K. Geoffrey 
White, Demystifying Wine Expertise: Olfactory Threshold, Perceptual Skill and Semantic 
Memory in Expert and Novice Wine Judges, 27 CHEMICAL SENSES 747, 754 (2002) (asserting 
that forced naming of a perceived odour may interfere with wine recognition performance); 
Jonathan W. Schooler & Tonya Y. Engstler-Schooler, Verbal Overshadowing of Visual 
Memories: Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid, 22 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 36, 5152 (1990) 
(revealing the results of a study where recognition of [an] initial color was impaired when [the] 
subjects described the color). But see Westerman & Larsen, supra note 79, at 42224 (showing 
no effect for verbal description of an image of a car). 
 82. Bretton H. Talbot et al., The Verbal Overshadowing Effect: Influence on Perception, 4 
INTUITION 12, 1215 (2008); See also Toby J. Lloyd-Jones, Charity Brown & Simon Clarke, 
Verbal Overshadowing of Perceptual Discrimination, 13 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 269, 
27273 (2006) (finding that verbal descriptions of faces interfered with subjects 
subsequent ability to distinguish different faces from nonfaces). 
 83. Talbot et al., supra note 82, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 84. See GERALD ZALTMAN, HOW CUSTOMERS THINK 1213, 16667, 18083 (2003) 
(citing studies and experiments demonstrating advertisings ability to infiltrate memory 
and even to create memories of events that never occurred, usually through verbal 
descriptions); Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and 
Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 251 (2005) 
(discussing an experiment where subjects ability to judge whether three-dimensional 
objects were identical or different decreased when the subject was exposed to other 
participants wrong answers); Kathryn A. Braun & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Advertisings 
Misinformation Effect, 12 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 569, 586 (1998) ([M]isinformation 
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That is, verbal overshadowing from an external source is also 
extremely powerful. One possibility is that consumers suffer 
failures of source attribution: people are much better at 
remembering first-order information (the jam was tasty) than at 
remembering the source of that information (the ad said the jam 
was tasty), so they conflate direct experience with statements about 
the experience, even when they have tasted the jam themselves.85  
Experts in a field, who are used to producing verbal 
descriptions, can resist verbal overshadowing when they are 
tested later on their memories, but nonexperts cannot, basically 
because theyre better at perceiving than at talking about what 
theyre perceiving.86 This might suggest that trademark 
specialists can avoid these problems, but the fact finders 
receiving the descriptions are extremely unlikely to be trademark 
specialists and will, therefore, be at risk for these distortions. As 
a result, how the witnesses and lawyers talk about the images at 
issue and direct a fact finders attention to specific features 
will quite literally change how the fact finder sees the 
images.87 In the case of trademark specifically, preliminary 
                                            
received following a direct experience with a product altered the recollections respondents 
made about that product.); Kathryn A. Braun, Rhiannon Ellis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make My 
Memory: How Advertising Can Change Our Memories of the Past, 19 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 
1, 1718 (2002) (discussing research finding that featuring impossible events in 
autobiographical advertising can cause people to believe they had experienced the events); 
Kathryn A. Braun, Postexperience Advertising Effects on Consumer Memory, 25 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 319, 332 (1999) (finding that advertising making verbal claims about good taste can 
induce consumers to change taste judgments from negative to positive); Kathryn A. Braun-
LaTour et al., How and When Advertising Can Influence Memory for Consumer Experience, 33 
J. ADVERT. 7, 19 (2004) (observing that ads changed memories to be consistent with the 
advertised claims, inducing people to believe they had personally met Bugs Bunny at a Disney 
theme park); Matthew J. Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, Experimental 
Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854, 
85455 (2006) (discovering that knowledge of others music ratings affects listeners own 
ratings); Bruce F. Hall, A New Model for Measuring Advertising Effectiveness, J. ADVERT. RES., 
Mar.Apr. 2002, at 23, 26 (From an advertising and marketing perspective, this is a major 
breakthrough: the work showed that exposure to advertising can transform objective sensory 
information, such as taste, in a consumers memory, prior to the judgment process, and after 
the consumer had tasted the product.); Melanie Wells, In Search of the Buy Button, FORBES, 
Sept. 1, 2003, at 62, 6566 (summarizing evidence that ad claims can change consumers own 
perceptions and judgments). 
 85. See Dario L.M. Sacchi, Franca Agnoli & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Changing 
History: Doctored Photographs Affect Memory for Past Public Events, 21 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1005, 100708, 1019 (2007) (suggesting that doctored photographs 
can [lead] to the creation of false memories). 
 86. See Melcher & Schooler, supra note 81, at 233, 23940, 24243 (The present 
study also provides further support for the hypothesis that the nature of ones expertise in 
a domain is a critical determinant of susceptibility to verbal overshadowing.). 
 87. See CHARLES SEIFE, PROOFINESS: THE DARK ARTS OF MATHEMATICAL 
DECEPTION 57 (2010) (explaining how supposedly expert guidance can induce people 
to see patterns in randomness). 
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research by Lionel Bently and his co-investigators suggests 
that trademark laws multifactor test for infringementa 
classic example of a word-based frameinterferes with peoples 
judgments of marks.88 
In one sense, this is what we expect lawyers to do: spin a 
case to make their sides account of the facts seem more 
persuasive. And Lanham Act disputes, at least those over 
nonexpressive uses, often involve well-funded businesses on both 
sides, making equity concerns less salient.89 But the verbal 
overshadowing evidence suggests that this phenomenon has 
particularly negative consequences when the legal inquiry is 
supposed to be what a reasonable consumer would think about 
an image, because the process inherently distorts fact finders 
perceptions.90 One driver behind ridiculous outcomes, such as 
judicial findings that a parody ad for Michelob Oily  was 
likely to cause confusion with authorized Michelob products,91 
may be the way both consumer surveys seeking evidence of 
confusion and the multifactor confusion test create verbal frames 
that encourage respondents and judges to think differently about 
what theyre seeing. 
Of course, the adversarial system is going to remain in place, 
but that doesnt mean that we should ignore systematic distortions 
                                            
Drawing a line or curve through a clot of data is a very powerful method of 
shaping the way people interpret it. The line is a symbol of order; it shows that a 
pattern has been found within the raw scattershot chaos of points in the graph. 
Even if our eyes are unable to see the pattern directly, the line tells us what we 
should be seeingeven when its not there. 
Id.; see also GISELE FREUND, PHOTOGRAPHY & SOCIETY 149 (1980) (Few people 
realize that the meaning of a photograph can be changed completely by the 
accompanying caption, by its juxtaposition with other photographs, or by the manner 
in which people and events are photographed.). 
 88. This information was gained through the Authors personal communication with 
Lionel Bently. Other academic work has made a similar point. See Michael Grynberg, The 
Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1283, 1304 (The use of multifactor tests 
produces any number of problems, including the possibility that they compromise the 
accuracy of outcomes.). 
 89. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 170001 & nn.6276 (1999) (listing product configuration trademark 
disputes between a number of well-funded companies, including Taco Cabana, Topps, 
Sunbeam Products, and others). 
 90. See, e.g., SEIFE, supra note 87, at 56 (If you take any random collection of data 
and squint hard enough, youll see a pattern of some sort. If youre clever, you can get 
other people to see the pattern too.); Tjaco Walvis, Avoiding Advertising Research 
Disaster: Advertising and the Uncertainty Principle, 10 J. BRAND MGMT. 403, 405 (2003) 
(arguing that the design of a focus group can influence the responses to the point that [i]f 
the research design is changed, the answers change). 
 91. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publns, 28 F.3d 769, 772, 775 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
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produced by our present ways of thinking about advertising. If 
material confusion over source and other materially false claims 
harm consumersand I believe they dothen we should worry 
about a process that does a bad job of identifying true deception. 
Certain interventions designed to direct fact finders away 
from analysis might limit these effects,92 but they would likely 
run contrary to courts desire to fence in fact finders and review 
their decisions, and would certainly lead to further complaints 
about the unpredictability of infringement cases. If visual 
perception depends not only on what something looks like, but 
also on what it means,93 then we should demand more rigor in 
judicial definitions of what infringement (and false advertising) 
means. 
What should be done? Experts in the field might be given 
more weight not because they react like average consumers but 
because they can produce less-distorted descriptions of a mark. 
We might also rely more heavily on marketing experts in general, 
rather than on litigation-specific consumer surveys. 
Another possibility would be to minimize guidance: just ask 
fact finders whether the junior mark is likely to be confusing, 
rather than offer a multifactor test. Barton Beebes empirical 
research suggests that many of the factors are often unimportant 
in any event, serving as a distraction or at best as a way of 
articulating justifications for conclusions a court has already 
reached.94 Given the well-documented doctrinal and practical 
troubles with the substantial similarity test in copyright,95 which 
purports to give fact finders a general directive very much like 
instructions just to look for confusing similarity, its hard to hope 
that removing standards would be successful in trademark. It 
would also be extremely difficult to convince courts of appeals to 
adopt this approach to the Lanham Act, given that they already 
often resist deference to trial courts fact finding in trademark 
                                            
 92. See Christian A. Meissner & Amina Memon, Verbal Overshadowing: A Special 
Issue Exploring Theoretical and Applied Issues, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 869, 870 
(2002) (suggesting that the nature of the instructions is important to the extent of verbal 
overshadowing; meta-analysis shows that overshadowing is more likely when subjects are 
given an elaborative instruction instead of a free recall instruction (citing Christian A. 
Meissner & John C. Brigham, A Meta-Analysis of the Verbal Overshadowing Effect in 
Face Identification, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 603, 613 (2001))). 
 93. Gary Lupyan & Michael J. Spivey, Perceptual Processing Is Facilitated by 
Ascribing Meaning to Novel Stimuli, 18 CURRENT BIOLOGY R410, R412 (2008). 
 94. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 161415 (2006). 
 95. E.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, at 40 & n.180; Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright 
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
719, 72224 (1987). 
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and advertising cases.96 Like most people, appellate judges are 
pretty sure they know how to interpret what theyre seeing, but 
they worry about everybody else missing the obvious.  
In the end, increasing awareness of the problem and 
encouraging courts to make more use of general social science 
and marketing evidence, rather than easily manipulated case-
specific surveys, may be the best we can do. 
D. Words in Trade Dress Cases 
In property law generally, Carol Rose has argued that the 
visual is key for signaling the boundaries of ownership. Without 
pictures, judges flail about in their attempts to explain property 
disputes.97 In fact, some modern forms of property regulation, 
such as zoning regulations specifying aesthetic characteristics, 
regularly rely on picturesa somewhat unusual situation for the 
law.98 
                                            
 96. See Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 132931 (7th Cir. 
1993) (applying a clearly erroneous standard but nonetheless scrutinizing the facts of 
the case based on each of seven separate factors applied by the district court). In practice, 
appellate panels are likely to act like Judge Posner by reevaluating the evidence 
according to their own assessment of likely confusion even where, as in the Seventh 
Circuit, the formal standard requires deference unless the trial courts assessment was 
clearly erroneous. Id.; see also Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 
153, 16061 (2d Cir. 2007) (reversing district courts determination in a false advertising 
case based on its own view of the ads), abrogated on other grounds by EBay, Inc. v. 
Mercexchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). A few courts have been somewhat more open 
about their willingness to revisit trial court outcomes by characterizing the ultimate 
question of likely confusion as a mixed question of law and fact, though they still claim to 
defer to the district courts factual findings. See, e.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The 
Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1996) (Whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion is a mixed question of fact and law. We apply a clearly erroneous 
standard to the district courts findings of fact supporting the likelihood of confusion 
factors, but review de novo the legal question of whether those foundational facts 
constitute a likelihood of confusion. (citation omitted)); BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. 
McNeilP.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 104344 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying a de novo standard 
of review when balancing . . . factors to determine the likelihood of confusion). 
 97. CAROL M. ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 267, 276 (1994) 
(One can get a sense of the awkwardness of verbal descriptions from the examples that 
appear all too frequently in the legal literature of property. Judicial opinions often 
describe disputed properties, usually in the first few paragraphs, and in so doing they 
illustrate the ways that mere words can leave the chagrined readers scratching their 
heads.). 
 98.  
 As in some other areas of property law, the law of historic preservation 
makes pictures essential for laying out the features that conform to a given 
historic style. Though a verbal description might be concocted, a picture is far 
more comprehensible . . . .  
  Why do the specifications for historic properties seem to call for an 
illustration rather than a verbal depiction? Why will words not do so well? Some 
might claim that words alone will not do for any form of knowledge and that all 
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In trademark, too, an image can form the boundaries of what 
a trademark owner owns. While many marks are registered as 
character marksmeaning the trademark owner claims the word 
in any formdesign marks are also standard, and the visual 
design establishes the scope of the trademark owners initial 
claim.99 Even for words claimed as words, establishing 
infringement ostensibly requires looking at the mark as its 
actually used, including its font and any surrounding visual 
elements.100 
At the same time, trademark doctrine, in places, formally 
equates words and imagesthe term Blue Dog will be considered 
highly similar to a drawing of a blue dog for purposes of 
assessing whether the two marks are likely to cause confusion.101 
Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, held 
that trademark law does not make ontological distinctions. 
Anything can be a trademark, whether its a color, a sound, or 
even a smell, as long as it serves as an indicator of source.102 
But thats not the end of the story. Legal distrust of images has 
encouraged resort to words where words werent part of the 
trademark. The same Supreme Court that rejected ontological 
distinctions in holding that color alone could serve as a trademark 
quickly followed that case with another, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc.,103 unanimously holding that only some types of 
                                            
knowledge is essentially perceptual (and sight the most privileged perception), 
but one need not subscribe to such visual imperialism to discern sights 
significance in property. Property, even understood as a set of claims against 
other persons, often revolves about access to some resource that exists in space 
and extension, and for that reason vision may be the first sense to be called upon 
in apprehending property.  
Id. at 274 (footnotes omitted). 
 99. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, BASIC FACTS ABOUT TRADEMARKS 6 (2010), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/BasicFacts_with_correct_links.pdf 
(explaining that character marks are not limited to a specific font, style, size, or color and 
therefore give[ ] [the owner] broader protection than a special form drawing); Gruner + Jahr 
USA Publg. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 107778 (2d Cir. 1993) ([T]he 
trademark registration of the title PARENTS in its distinctive typeface did not confer an 
exclusive right to plaintiff on variations of the word parent, such term being more 
generic than descriptive.). 
 100. See, e.g., GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that plaintiffs GoTo website logo was infringed by the defendants Go 
Network logo where both logos consisted of white capital letters in an almost identical 
sans serif font rendered on a green circle matted by a yellow square background). 
 101. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petrol. Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(equating the term Pegasus with the symbol of the flying horse Pegasus as 
synonymous). 
 102. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 16263 (1995) (holding that 
no rule bars color alone from use as a trademark). 
 103. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 21112 (2000). 
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marks can be inherently distinctive.104 The Court ruled that 
product design trade dress can only be deemed to serve as a mark 
if the claimant shows secondary meaningrecognition by 
consumers that this particular configuration (for example, the 
shape of a Volkswagen Beetle) signifies source, even though most 
product configurations (for example, the shape of a standard car) 
dont do so.105 Inherent distinctiveness was a concept developed 
for certain categories of words, and the Court deemed it a bad fit 
for product design, as well as for color.106 So much for ontological 
neutrality. 
The Courts conclusion in Wal-Mart depended both on 
concerns about protecting freedom to compete on product 
features and on the generalization that, while consumers often 
expect words to be trademarks, they are unlikely to expect that 
even an unusual product shape is a mark indicating source as 
opposed to a striking product feature.107 Because there are good 
reasons to use product designs even without trademark 
significance, the marketer has to teach consumers that a 
particular shape indicates a particular source, generating 
secondary meaning. Other nonverbal marks, such as ordinary 
sounds and all smells, are treated the same way by the PTO.108 
The social meaning of many nonverbal forms of communication 
differs enough from the social meaning of words to justify 
                                            
 104. See id. at 21011, 216 ([A] mark is inherently distinctive if [its] intrinsic 
nature serves to identify a particular source. (second alteration in original) (quoting Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992))). 
 105. Id. at 21516. 
 106. Id. at 21013. 
 107. Id. at 21213 (The attribution of inherent distinctiveness to certain categories 
of word marks and product packaging derives from the fact that the very purpose of 
attaching a particular word to a product, or encasing it in a distinctive packaging, is most 
often to identify the source of the product. . . . Consumers are therefore predisposed to 
regard those symbols as indication of the producer, which is why such symbols almost 
automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand, and immediately . . . signal a 
brand or a product source. (citations omitted) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 16263) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 108. In re Vertex Grp., LLC, Serial Nos. 76601697, 78940163, 2009 WL 625562, 
at *67 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2009) (reiterating the rule that commonplace sounds, or those 
which individuals may have been exposed to under other circumstances . . . must be 
shown to have acquired distinctiveness, and adding that for goods that make the sound 
in their normal course of operation, registration is available only on a showing of acquired 
distinctiveness); Amanda E. Compton, Acquiring a Flavor for Trademarks: Theres No 
Common Taste in the World, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340, 34547 (2010) 
(discussing the Trademark Trial and Appeal Boards decision in In re N.V. Organon, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006), to uphold the refusal of registration of a flavor as 
a trademark for prescription medicine and discussing the difficulties with protecting 
flavor as a trademark); see also Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162 (reasoning that, because the 
universe of things that can qualify as a trademark is set forth in the broadest of terms 
by the Lanham Act, shapes, sounds, and scents can all qualify for registration). 
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separate treatment as a matter of trademark law.109 Another way 
to say this: product design, according to the Court, has intrinsic 
value to consumers apart from source-indicating value.110 (Except 
that the same is true of words, which is why outside of Hot Topic 
we see few clothing or makeup colors described as bile yellow or 
vomit green. Marketers strive to give even completely invented 
product names a euphonious sound that resonates with the 
characteristics they want consumers to associate with the 
product.111 Again, think Viagra.) 
Protection for trade dressthe overall packaging or 
configuration of a productis one of trademarks most active 
areas, as advertisers take advantage of the power of nonverbal 
communication to strengthen their brands.112 Trade dress 
litigation has correspondingly boomed in the past few decades. 
Yet, it is always vital to define the claimed trade dress, to know 
exactly what features the plaintiff is trying to protect. When 
trade dress is unregistered (since registration already involves 
detailed description, including words113), courts have regularly 
required descriptions of the plaintiffs claimed trade dress to be 
                                            
 109. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 21215 (commenting that product packaging design 
can also be inherently distinctive, according to the Court, though such packaging 
generally includes words; at a minimum, nonverbal designs have to be fairly complex 
before they can be inherently distinctive, whereas a single word (including a made-up 
word) can be inherently distinctive). 
 110. See id. at 213 (attributing the main goal of most product designs as render[ing] 
the product itself more useful, rather than identify[ing] the source). We could call this 
aesthetic value, crossing the line into aesthetic functionality in many cases. See Qualitex, 
514 U.S. at 16970 (quoting the Restatement for the proposition that a designs aesthetic 
value lies in its ability to confe[r] a significant benefit that cannot practically be 
duplicated by the use of alternative designs and defining the test for aesthetic 
functionality as whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder 
competition (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1993))). 
 111. See Eric Yorkston & Geeta Menon, A Sound Idea: Phonetic Effects of Brand 
Names on Consumer Judgments, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 50 (2004) (Creating a 
successful brand name depends not only upon the creation of a name that is congruent 
with the product category, but one that phonetically fits the positioning of the brand 
within that product category.). 
 112. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209, 21213 (defining trade dress and discussing it as 
symbols [that] almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand, and 
immediately . . . signal a brand or a product source (citations omitted) (quoting Qualitex, 
514 U.S. at 16263) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay 
of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L. REV. 769, 779 (1991) (Trade 
dress protection has existed for decades, recent years, however, have seen an exponential 
growth in trade dress case law. (footnote omitted)). 
 113. See TMEP, supra note 52, § 1202.02(c)(i)(ii), at 1200-67 to -69 (providing that 
applications to register trade dress must clearly identify the portions of the overall dress 
claimed as a mark and that a sufficient verbal description of the mark must also be 
submitted). 
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in words.114 Otherwise, they worry, different jurors might focus on 
different elements of the overall image.115 
This distrust of the imagethe worry that different people 
might see different things in the pictures, whereas words will 
have a more stable meaning116is part of a broader fear that 
pictures will be taken as facts substituting for the exercise of 
legal judgment. For example, Hampton Dellinger, attacking the 
use of images in Supreme Court opinions, argues that images 
should be avoided by courts because they feel so true but are 
deceptive and overly emotional.117 Likewise, Jennifer Mnookin 
documents the early judicial treatment of photographic evidence, 
which combined hope that photographs would provide 
unimpeachable evidence with fear of the same power as a 
substitute for legal judgment.118 To put the concern in modern 
                                            
 114. See, e.g., Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1909 (JGK), 2009 
WL 2486054, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (The plaintiff alleges that because a picture 
is worth a thousand words, the images without a doubt provide the most precise 
definition of the protected trade dress possible. However, images alone do not satisfy the 
plaintiffs obligation to articulate the distinctive features of the trade dress. (citing Natl 
Lighting Co. v. Bridge Metal Indus., LLC, 601 F. Supp. 2d 556, 56263 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that the court could not be expected to distill from a set of images those elements that 
are common to a line of products and both distinctive and non-functional))); 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 4, § 8:3, at 8-11 to -12 (Whatever may be claimed as the combination of 
elements making up the product or its packaging and presentation, in the authors 
opinion, it will not do to solely identify in litigation such a combination as the trade 
dress. Rather, the discrete elements which make up that combination should be 
separated out and identified in a list. Only then can the court and the parties coherently 
define exactly what the trade dress consists of and determine whether that trade dress is 
valid and if what the accused is doing is an infringement. (footnote omitted)). But see 
Dayco Prods., LLC v. Dorman Prods, Inc., No. 09-cv-13139, 2010 WL 3855221, at *4, *6 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2010) (allowing plaintiff to provide the requisite factual allegations 
in pictorial form when alleging distinctive trade dress, at least for purposes of surviving 
a motion to dismiss); Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1208, 120911 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that district court sufficiently defined protected 
trade dress by dividing relevant designs into three groups and providing a description and 
pictures for each group). 
 115. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 11617 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(addressing the concern that ill-defined trade dress could mean the verdict may be based 
on inconsistent findings). 
 116. So, for example, when the Supreme Court reassured citizens that a religious 
monument was not a government endorsement of religion, it commented that while 
monuments using words are often susceptible to multiple interpretations, the 
communicative effects of purely visual monuments are likely to be even more variable. 
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 113435 (2009). 
 117. See Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of 
Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1704, 170608 (1997) (Yet the unique attributes of these attachments pose special 
dangers. Because their neutrality and accuracy are so readily assumed, attachments 
elude the skepticism with which written opinions are generally reviewed.). 
 118. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power 
of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1820, 58 (1998). 
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terms: images, which are processed extremely quickly and 
holistically in our minds, may disarm our critical functions, and, 
thus, a fact finder might not analyze them properly.119 
This anxiety about the power of images is consistent with 
the demands for word-based definitions in the area of trade 
dress, though the explicit concern for emotionality (which finds 
its echo in modern marketing theories that emphasize that most 
of trademarks value comes from consumers emotional 
commitments) has been replaced with concern for undisclosed 
variation among fact finders.120 Note that the relevance of the 
distance between words and reality that helped explain the 
Abercrombie spectrum, discussed in section A, is now reversed. 
We need words to make sure that everyone agrees on the 
protectable elements of a design, because the images might be too 
full of meaning, too close to the design itselfa map the same 
size as the underlying territory. 
The verbal description requirements for trade dress help 
narrow the breadth of a plaintiffs ownership claims, but they 
also relate to the scope of infringement law. That is, infringement 
used to be about whether consumers would think that the 
defendants product came from the plaintiff.121 Now, plaintiffs 
often claim not that anyone would think that they made the 
defendants product, but rather that some consumers are likely to 
think that they approved, licensed, or sponsored the defendants 
producta much more amorphous inquiry.122 If the question were 
only when you look at X, do you think it is Y? then it would be 
                                            
 119. See NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 7 (2009) (comparing a viewers 
instant understanding of an image to a readers gradual grasp of the written words 
subject matter). 
 120. See ZALTMAN, supra note 84, at 19 (describing the emotional benefits of a Nestlé 
Crunch Bar and the failure of a marketing campaign that focused . . . on just the sensory 
benefits of the candy bar); Bradford, supra note 13, at 1240 (Any relevant information 
about the underlying good, including advertising claims, community reputation, and the 
individuals previous experience with that product becomes associated with the 
trademark and is easily accessible to the consumer upon encountering the mark in 
commerce.); Buccafusco, supra note 2, at 61618, 628, 650 (concluding that the average 
jurors failure of analysis undermines the status of [an image] as representative of a 
witnesss testimony). 
 121. See McKenna, supra note 11, at 1848 (describing the traditional function of 
trademark law as protecting against competitors that dishonestly marked their products 
and passed them off as those of the mark owner). 
 122. See id. at 1911 (Traditional trademark law focused narrowly on whether 
consumers would regard the use of [a logo] on a hat as an indication of the actual origin of 
the hat. . . . Modern law, by contrast, condemns any use by a third party that is likely to 
cause confusion as to a mark owners sponsorship of or affiliation with a third partys use, 
whether or not any such relationship is material to consumers purchasing decisions.). 
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much easier to avoid defining X. With the question when you 
look at X, do you associate it with Y? there is a greater premium 
on knowing exactly what X ishow far something can deviate 
from X before it no longer reminds consumers of X.123 With 
registered marks, the registration process serves some 
definitional function since the PTO will only register what it can 
define,124 but for unregistered trade dress courts have attempted 
to cabin the scope of claims through forcing tighter definitions of 
what is protected. However, this is a difficult and inconsistent 
rearguard action against the real problem of overexpansion of a 
trademarks scope.125 
While requiring a verbal description of trade dress 
constrains the scope of trademark protection at the intake stage, 
it raises obvious problems of verbal overshadowing: the definition 
of the trade dress may then take over from the actual products at 
issue. Any plaintiff who survives this process may thus end up 
with a fact finder who is comparing the defendants trade dress to 
the plaintiffs words rather than the plaintiffs trade dress. It is 
unclear who, if anyone, will be helped, though the process by 
which pointing out similarities makes it easier to see those 
similarities may ultimately favor the plaintiff. 
If the laws interest were in getting a real understanding of 
plaintiffs trade dress, words would be a bad way to do it because, 
at best, they will approximate what the trade dress is like, and, 
more likely, they will change the ways in which the fact finders 
see the trade dress, distorting their reactions to the parties 
goods. If the laws interest in imposing a word-based description 
requirement is in screening out a lot of claimed trade dresses 
because of the risks to competition, however, then it might do an 
acceptable job.126 
                                            
 123. I thank Mark McKenna for this point. 
 124. See, e.g., In re Lorillard Licensing Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1312, 1316, 132223 
(T.T.A.B. 2011) (refusing to register claimed combination of orange text on green 
background for cigarettes, where specimen showed something far more specific than that). 
 125. See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 42327 (identifying and 
critiquing this overexpansion). 
 126. See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 38081 
(2d Cir. 1997) (While trademarking a generic term would create a monopoly in a 
necessary word or phrase, granting trade dress protection to an ordinary product design 
would create a monopoly in the goods themselves. . . . [A] plaintiffs inability to explain to 
a court exactly which aspects of its product design[s] merit protection may indicate that 
its claim is pitched at an improper level of generality, i.e., the claimant seeks protection 
for an unprotectable style, theme or idea.); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 
58 F.3d 27, 3233 (2d Cir. 1995) (suggesting that an overly generalized description of trade 
dress may indicate that that dress is no more than a concept or idea to be applied to 
particular products and as a result constitutes an overextension of trade dress 
protection). 
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This latter motivation, a general reluctance to protect trade 
dress, has solid justifications. But being able to describe a trade 
dress in words doesnt actually tell a court anything about whether 
competitors need that trade dress to compete, whether that trade 
dress is aesthetically or mechanically functional, or even whether 
consumers are likely to perceive it as indicating source. A verbal 
description requirement is therefore ill-suited for identifying trade 
dress that should actually be protected.127 On the other side, because 
the verbal description requirement is becoming a prerequisite for 
protection even before a court analyzes functionality or secondary 
meaning, it is positioned to make just the wrong distinctions: a 
nonfunctional trade dress with secondary meaning might not be 
reducible to words.128 This under- and over-inclusiveness of a verbal 
description requirement suggests that a different means of limiting 
protection for trade dress ought to be sought, whether thats a 
souped-up burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence) for 
showing nonfunctionality and secondary meaning,129 a refusal to 
protect the look of product lines, or a complete rejection of the 
concept of product design trade dress. As with the Abercrombie 
spectrum, greater honesty about our reasons for adopting a screen 
of some sort could produce greater coherence and predictability in 
our results. 
When a court expresses a worry that different jurors will see 
the same pictures differently unless theyre sufficiently guided by 
words,130 we should evaluate that justification for a verbal 
description requirement on its merits. Courts apparently dont 
trust jurors to come to reasonable conclusions about trade dress 
on their own. Notably, courts dont seem to have the same 
anxiety that individual jurors will interpret the multifactor 
confusion test differently and, thus, reach an apparently unified 
result for very different individual reasons. 
Right now, distrust of images has helped limit the scope of 
trade dress by making it harder for plaintiffs to plead that they 
                                            
 127. See Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, No. 08 
Civ. 4810 (THK), 2011 WL 4035751, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011) (noting that it is the 
trade dress, and not the verbal description of it, that must ultimately be evaluated for 
whether it deserves trademark protection). 
 128. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 8:3, at 8-11 & n.150 (citing recent case law 
emphasizing the need for plaintiffs to provide a precise list of discrete elements that 
make up their trade dress as an initial step in infringement suits). 
 129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006) (putting the burden on the plaintiff in a trade dress 
action to prov[e] that the matter sought to be protected is not functional). We would of course 
still need to know what the features were to determine whether they were nonfunctional, but 
pictures might be able to define the features, especially if the plaintiff presented images of 
competing designs to show that the features it claimed werent functionally required. 
 130. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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have a protectable mark. But we should consider whether verbal 
description requirements, with their distorting effects, are the best 
tools for the job. As the next section suggests, discomfort with 
images may limit trademark in trade dress cases, but it can 
contribute to trademark expansionism elsewhere. 
E. Images and Expressive Uses 
Outside the core of trademarks protection against confusing 
uses on competing products, images have proved particularly 
troublesome. There has been much litigation about when 
expressive uses can proceed without trademark owners 
permission. In one notable case, the Ninth Circuit adapted a test it 
had used for word marks to cover images as well. Mattel sued an 
artist who had created Food Chain Barbie, a series of photographs 
of Barbie dolls interacting with kitchen appliances and food.131 The 
governing test for allowing unauthorized nominative fair uses 
required that the defendant must (1) need to use the mark (here, 
the overall shape of the Barbie doll) to identify the trademarked 
product; (2) use no more of the mark than necessary (a requirement 
that in the past had been interpreted to mean that block-letter 
replication of a mark was acceptable, but copying a distinctive font 
was not); and (3) do nothing else to indicate source or sponsorship.132 
 
                                            
 131. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 79697 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 132. Id. at 810; New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publg., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
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The artist apparently had a problem with (2): it would be 
possible, indeed easy, to refer to Barbie without using her entire 
body. Siding with the artist, however, the court of appeals 
reinterpreted nominative fair use to allow replication of a visual 
image when the mark at issue was itself visual,133 despite the initial 
grounding of factor (2) in a word/presentation distinction. This move 
is sensible and eminently correct in the context of artistic uses of 
Barbie, but it also reveals a fundamental instability in the concept 
of what is necessary in terms of a reference to a mark. The idea 
that Coca-Cola will always mean the same thing as  is 
reassuring, but wrong.134 The whole point of reserving that special 
font for Coca-Cola is that the mark in the font has extra meaning to 
which competitors are denied access, and there might well be an 
artistic or other legitimate reason to invoke that extra meaning. 
This instability in nominative fair use is a particularly disturbing 
result given that there is now a trend for courts to find that an 
arguably nominative fair use that flunks the three-part test is 
infringing,135 without engaging in further analysis of whether 
confusion over source is actually likely.  
After Mattel, the nominative fair use test both acknowledges 
                                            
 133. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 81011. 
 134. See John R. Doyle & Paul A. Bottomley, The Massage in the Medium: Transfer 
of Connotative Meaning from Typeface to Names and Products, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 396, 398, 403, 407 (2009) ([T]ypeface conveys connotations of its own.). The 
connotations of the Coca-Cola font in particular, of course, have been built up by decades 
of targeted advertising. Logos also are important for nonliterate populations. See, e.g., 
Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Propertys Need for a Disability Perspective, 20 GEO. MASON 
U. C.R. L.J. 181, 194 (2010) (Judge Kozinski makes a favorable determination for the 
newspapers because they do not use the New Kids distinctive logo or anything else that 
isnt needed to make the announcements intelligible to readers. . . . Judge Kozinskiprobably 
entirely unaware of what he was doingremoves many developmentally disabled 
members of society from the class of persons who could benefit from the nominative fair 
use doctrine. (footnote omitted) (quoting New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308)); 
Madhubalan Viswanathan, José Antonio Rosa & James Edwin Harris, Decision Making 
and Coping of Functionally Illiterate Consumers and Some Implications for Marketing 
Management, 69 J. MARKETING 15, 21 (2005) (describing the reliance of functionally 
illiterate consumers on pictographic product information, including logos, font style, and 
color).  
 135. See, e.g., Autodesk, Inc. v. Dassault Systèmes SolidWorks Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 
1001, 101617 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment with respect to defendants 
need to use the mark but denying summary judgment for amount of the mark used and 
confusion of source or sponsorship); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 
1171, 1181 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that using more of a mark than necessary might 
cause confusion, a lower standard than the ordinary likely confusion standard, and yet 
seemingly presuming that flunking the nominative fair use test would make confusion 
likely). The Third Circuits version of nominative fair use doesnt seem to have this flaw, 
though it has others. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 49, 9293 (2008) (stating that the Third Circuits approach requires a defendant to 
litigate the whole likelihood of confusion issue before addressing any nominative fair use 
questions). 
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the power of the image in certain special casesallowing artists 
to use Barbies face, not just her nameand hides it, using block-
lettered words as the model of acceptable nominative fair uses, 
deviations from which need explanation.136 Recognizing the artists 
need to depict Barbie, the law nonetheless puts words at the center 
of the analysis, treating nontextual material as, in the ordinary 
case, unnecessary. 
Dilution law also offers examples of struggles to deal with 
the power of images. In the influential Second Circuit case, Deere 
& Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., the issue was whether MTDs 
comparative ad constituted dilution under New York state law.137 
The problem was that, instead of just saying MTDs products are 
better than Deeres, the ad also showed a caricature of John 
Deeres deer logo, animating it and having it run humorously 
away from a small, nonthreatening dog.138 The court found 
dilution despite the strong protections for comparative 
advertising ordinarily provided by dilution law.139 The court did 
not require Deere to show any evidence of consumer reaction: it 
was simply obvious that the visual mockery of the logo was likely 
to tarnish the brand.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 136. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 810 (acknowledging that use of the Barbie figure 
conjure[s] up associations of Mattel); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, 
Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) (identifying a defendants use of block letters 
instead of using a plaintiffs distinctive lettering as an important consideration in 
nominative fair use cases). 
 137. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 138. Id. at 41. 
 139. Id. at 45. Federal dilution law explicitly exempts comparative advertising. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14247(b)(1)(A) (West 
2008) (containing the same exemption). State laws often dont explicitly provide for 
comparative advertising, but courts still tend to interpret state dilution statutes as if they 
were just like the federal law (except that some states extend dilution protection to 
nonfamous marks). See, e.g., Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (applying the same analysis to a state law dilution claim under Californias 
antidilution statute as a federal dilution claim under the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act); World Wrestling Fedn Entmt, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 
443 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that state and federal dilution inquiry was the same except 
for fame). 
 140. Deere, 41 F.3d at 42, 45. 
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The court concluded that: 
The commercial takes a static image of a graceful, full-size 
deersymbolizing Deeres substance and strengthand 
portrays, in an animated version, a deer that appears smaller 
than a small dog and scampers away from the dog and a lawn 
tractor, looking over its shoulder in apparent fear. Alterations 
of that sort, accomplished for the sole purpose of promoting a 
competing product, are properly found to be within New Yorks 
concept of dilution because they risk the possibility that 
consumers will come to attribute unfavorable characteristics to 
a mark and ultimately associate the mark with inferior goods 
and services.141 
In essence, the ad made the trademark look bad. While 
John Deere is allowedindeed, encouragedby trademark law 
to develop emotional connections with its logo, MTD cant 
attack the emotional meaning of the mark. Consider, by 
contrast, an instance in which the mark was pronounced with 
contempt by an ads narrator (as a political opponents name is 
in a standard political ad). It is difficult to imagine a court 
finding such a use dilutivenot only would it easily fall within 
the standard exemption for comparative advertising,142 it would 
seem to offend the First Amendment to allow truthful, 
nondeceptive commercial speech to be suppressed simply 
because it was likely to generate a negative emotional reaction 
in consumers. Deere didnt argue that MTD made false claims 
actionable under false advertising law, but the use of the 
image created a remedy in trademark.143 This is particularly 
troubling insofar as trademarks with positive emotional values 
are likely to be owned by dominant or well-established 
companies; those companies can leverage the emotional power 
of their brands against new competitors, but new competitors 
cant fight back on the emotional level. 
As we will see in the next Part, however, when the plaintiff 
has no property interest to assert, images can more easily be 
used to make nonactionable, yet false, claims. Where the Deere 
                                            
 141. Id. at 45. 
 142. Courts applying the same New York law as in Deere have found verbal 
comparative advertising nondiluting as a matter of law. See Diversified Mktg., Inc. v. 
Estee Lauder, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 128, 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to enjoin If You 
Like ESTEE LAUDER . . . Youll Love BEAUTY USA); Cumberland Packing Corp. v. 
Monsanto Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 561, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (distinguishing Deere, in a federal 
dilution case involving comparative advertising, because Deere evaluated a logo instead of 
a word mark). 
 143. Deere, 41 F.3d at 42. 
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court allowed dilution to bar an ad because it might change 
consumers affective responses to Deeres mark, advertising law 
regularly allows such imageseven when they go beyond affect 
to false implications. 
III. ADVERTISING GENERALLY 
Advertising theorists are well aware that images can make 
the same claims as text, only better. Images are better both 
because they are more persuasive than words and because the 
law governing advertising has not recognized this difference.144 
As a result, images can often make visual claims that would be 
unsubstantiated and, thus, unlawful if made in words.145 Though 
the law will uphold falsity claims against images in extreme 
circumstances,146 the mechanisms through which images 
                                            
 144. See, e.g., R.J. Ants, Inc. v. Marinelli Enters., LLC, 771 F. Supp. 2d 475, 49091 
(E.D. Pa. 2011) (applying a likelihood of confusion analysis to both the image and word 
elements of competing marks and finding the marks dissimilar). This is particularly true 
in low-involvement situations, when consumers arent motivated to pay much attention 
to ads. When consumers are highly involved, images provide a starting pointstill very 
importantbut when involvement is low, pictures can be determinative of consumers 
beliefs about products. See James Shanteau, Consumer Impression Formation: The 
Integration of Visual and Verbal Information, in NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN 
ADVERTISING 43, 55 (Sidney Hecker & David W. Stewart eds., 1988) (suggesting that 
visual information provides the starting point in the consumers impression of an ad and 
positing that if there is little or no subsequent processing, then visual information will 
dominate the final impression as well [but] [i]f, on the other hand, there is subsequent 
processing, then visual material provides a starting point which is gradually eclipsed by 
later text information). 
 145. See, e.g., DAVID M. BOUSH, MARIAN FRIESTAD & PETER WRIGHT, DECEPTION 
IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEPTIVE PERSUASION AND CONSUMER 
SELF-PROTECTION 74 (2009) (Pictorial metaphors may suppress counterarguing and 
deception-protection thinking by spreading consumers attention along multiple 
inferential pathways, and because people simply cannot counterargue pictures, thus 
causing inferences favorable to brand that could not be legally stated without 
substantiation.); FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 119, at 13 (Things can be said in 
pictures that cannot, for a variety of reasons, be named with words, and people often 
exploit those interstices between saying and showing to talk about the world.); David 
Vaver, Brand Culture: Trade Marks, Marketing and ConsumptionResponding Legally 
to Professor Schroeders Paper, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
CRITIQUE 177, 18586 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008) ([A]dvertisers use images rather 
than words to convey . . . messages [that would be inane if stated in words]: images do not 
actually tell lies. The viewer discerns the message subconsciously. A picture here really 
is worth a thousand words, but what exactly those words are or mean cannot accurately 
be pinned down as if they were words in a contract or conveyance. In short, it is easier to 
lie through pictures than through words; it is also easier to get away with it legally.). 
 146. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 
511, 516 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding images of two identical gas pumps or airline tickets with 
different prices literally false because the ad claimed through its visuals that, like the 
pumps or tickets, the drug being advertised was completely equivalent to the more 
expensive competing drug); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 31718 
(2d Cir. 1982) (finding image of an orange being squeezed directly into a carton literally 
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communicate often make it difficult to pin down an image-based 
falsehood in order to regulate it. 
Advertising, compared to other forms of communication, is 
particularly image-based and has become more so over the past 
century.147 Ralph Sharp Brown, Jr. wrote the classic 
condemnation of modern advertising from a trademark 
perspective, arguing that producers had gone into the business of 
selling image with no intrinsic value, and that this was not a goal 
worthy of legal protection.148 Image is in fact sold mainly with 
images, with assists from music and words reinforcing the 
visuals.149 As a result, proposals to regulate the nonfactual 
content of ads, which is characterized as manipulating and 
distorting consumers decisions by disabling them from 
responding rationally to the claims made, regularly focus on 
visual elements.150 
                                            
false where the oranges were subjected to pasteurization and occasionally freezing before 
being packaged), abrogated on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized in 
Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Intl, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1988); WarnerLambert 
Co. v. ScheringPlough Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5079 (MGC), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14620, at 
*34 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1991) (images of people sleeping in situations where they would 
normally be awake overwhelmed spoken words in television ad to create misleading 
impression that competitors allergy drug put all or almost all of its users to sleep, and 
images were likely to cause viewers to infer that advertisers allergy drug did not cause 
drowsiness). But see Nikkal Indus., Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1227, 123537 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to find an advertisement deceptive when a deceptive image was 
used without any supporting deceptive text). 
 147. Barbara J. Phillips & Edward F. McQuarrie, Beyond Visual Metaphor: A New 
Typology of Visual Rhetoric in Advertising, 4 MARKETING THEORY 113, 113, 115 (2004). 
 148. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of 
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 116869 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 
162223 (1999). 
 149. See, e.g., MARITA STURKEN & LISA CARTWRIGHT, PRACTICES OF LOOKING: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO VISUAL CULTURE 33 (2d ed. 2009) (It is important to the indexical meaning 
of most advertisements that they use photographs to construct their messages. In that 
photographs always carry with them the connotation of photographic truth yet are also a 
primary source of fantasy, they provide important dual meanings in many advertisements. 
However, text functions in ads to shape the commodity signs of the image, to rein in and limit 
the meaning of the image in some way.); David Huron, Music in Advertising: An Analytic 
Paradigm, 73 MUSICAL Q. 557, 561 (1989) (describing the importance of music in creating 
structural continuity between sequences of visual images). 
 150. See, e.g., Rebecca Arbogast, A Proposal to Regulate the Manner of Tobacco 
Advertising, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 393, 397 (1986) (proposing a ban on 
photographs, drawings, or graphics in tobacco advertising other than those that convey 
factual information about company, brand name, and potential health concerns); Yoav 
Hammer, Expressions Which Preclude Rational Processing: The Case for Regulating Non-
Informational Advertisements, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 437 (2005) ([M]odern 
advertisements hardly convey information or clear arguments. Instead, they focus on an 
attempt to create a positive emotion within the viewers. The messages come in mostly 
visual and non verbal form, and viewers are hardly aware of the fact that messages have 
been conveyed. These characteristics of modern advertisements are the result of 
advertisers conclusion on the basis of many psychological studies, that emotional and 
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The following sections detail current research on images and 
how advertising regulation does not conform to the state of the art. 
Using the example of cigarette regulation, I also explore the 
potential for regulating images on their own terms and of fighting 
fire with fire: using images to disclose required information. 
A. What Marketers Know 
1. The Power of Images. Images have a number of 
advantages for marketers. Pictures are generally processed more 
quickly in the brain, contributing to their utility for advertisers 
who have at most a fraction of a second to catch a consumers 
attention.151 Pictures may also prime consumers to believe ads 
and lead to comparatively less in the way of conscious, thoughtful 
processing than words.152 As discussed in the previous Part, vivid 
ads work better than nonvivid ads, and vividness can readily be 
produced by pictures,153 which are especially effective under the 
conditions of distraction or limited attention under which 
consumers commonly experience ads.154 Ads that are emotionally 
                                            
experiential advertisements, rather than informational ones, are much more successful in 
causing viewers to internalize the advertising messages. The state of affairs where 
advertisers influence the decisions, values, and identity of viewers by means of a non 
cognitive process is problematic. It conflicts with our idea of man as an autonomous 
creature whose values, identity, and decisions reflect a conscious choice.). 
 151. See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 119, at 7 (While our eyes and brains can 
process either verbal or visual information faster than the conscious mind is capable of noticing 
(as evidenced by the efficacy of both verbal and visual stimuli in subconscious priming studies), 
we can get the gist of a visual display in a single fixation lasting less than a third of a second.). 
 152. See Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 17, 19 (finding that pictures are more 
effective than text at introducing post-experience information into consumer recollections). 
 153. See Punam Anand Keller & Lauren G. Block, Vividness Effects: A Resource-
Matching Perspective, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 295, 299, 301 (1997) (finding that vivid 
messages are more effective when individuals use limited mental resources to process the 
message); Jolita Kisielius & Brian Sternthal, Detecting and Explaining Vividness Effects 
in Attitudinal Judgments, 21 J. MARKETING RES. 54, 6162 (1984) ([N]o medium is 
necessarily superior when the aim is to enhance information availability. The impact of a 
pictorial stimulus . . . can be approximated by using instructions to image or concrete 
verbal information when advertising is transmitted by, say, radio.); John R. Rossiter 
& Larry Percy, Attitude Change Through Visual Imagery in Advertising, 9 J. ADVERT. 10, 
15 (1980) ([V]isual content in advertising is just as capable of increasing the consumers 
product attitude as is verbal content.). 
 154. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Clark Leavitt, Audience Involvement in 
Advertising: Four Levels, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 581, 583 (1984) (suggesting that the 
concepts of arousal and capacity allocation are suitable for advertising because advertising 
consists of messages received in . . . complex or noisy environment[s]); Joan Meyers-Levy, 
Elaborating on Elaboration: The Distinction Between Relational and Item-Specific 
Elaboration, 18 J. CONSUMER RES. 358, 36162, 364 (1991) (finding that pictorial cues 
assisted consumers in processing relationships between claims made in advertisements); 
Richard L. Oliver, Thomas S. Robertson & Deborah J. Mitchell, Imaging and Analyzing in 
Response to New Product Advertising, 22 J. ADVERT. 35, 35, 47 (1993) ([S]timulating 
imagery-based [(i.e., nonverbal)] processing in advertising is advantageous.). 
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engaging are more effective, and pictures can quickly and 
reliably evoke emotions;155 ads that show pictures of a product in 
use are also more effective than the alternatives.156 
Pictures dominate over words: when the two conflict, 
audiences are more likely to rely on the pictures.157 Using 
pictures emphasizing one side of a balanced news report, for 
example, biases readers perceptions of contested issues in favor 
of the pictured side, even though they have generally poor 
conscious recall of the content of the images.158 And images can 
distract from legally required disclosures and disclaimers, 
preventing them from influencing customers.159 But when false 
words and images appear together, they reinforce each other.160 
Pictures have a persistent influence: they are easier to 
remember than (roughly equivalent denotational) words and 
                                            
 155. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 119, at 78. 
 156. See David A. Aaker & Douglas M. Stayman, Implementing the Concept of 
Transformational Advertising, 9 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 237, 23940 (1992) (discussing 
the effectiveness of images in transformational advertising that creates, alters, or 
intensifies feelings that occur with the brand use experience); Gregory W. Boller, The 
Vicissitudes of Product Experience: Songs of Our Consuming Selves in Drama Ads, 17 
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 621, 62425 (1990) (finding that viewers exposed to drama 
ads engaged in a highly self-focused and self-participatory mode of processing and tended 
to adopt the perspective of ad characters); Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 9 
([D]rama ads that show the product in use have been linked to transformational effects, 
and ads with high affective content have been linked to this process as well. (citations 
omitted)); William D. Wells, Three Useful Ideas, 13 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 9, 9 
(1986) (discussing information encoded in visual ads and its effects on consumers when 
they come into contact with the advertised product). 
 157. Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 9 (citing Ruth Ann Smith, The Effects of 
Visual and Verbal Advertising Information on Consumers Inferences, 20 J. ADVERT. 13, 
2022 (1991)). 
 158. See Dolf Zillmann, Rhonda Gibson & Stephanie L. Sargent, Effects of Photographs in 
News-Magazine Reports on Issue Perception, 1 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 207, 22324 (1999) (finding 
that a pictorially depicted news bias was retained longer than balanced text and suggesting 
that poor recall of the image supports the theory that it is not the image itself being recalled 
but interconnected information that was encoded and [was] stored alongside the image). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 12324 (1991) (holding that Krafts 
attempts to add disclosures to an advertisement were insufficient because [g]enerally 
recognized marketing principles suggest that, given the distracting visual and audio 
elements . . . of the commercial, it is unlikely that the visual disclosure is effective); FED. 
TRADE COMMN, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING 13 (2000), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus41.pdf (suggesting 
that combinations of elements in online advertisements, including graphics, can 
undermine the requirement that disclosures be clear and conspicuous because they 
may result in consumers not noticing, reading or listening to the disclosure). 
 160. See Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 19 (When received only as a headline 
and within the longer text, the false words were more likely to be detected as false, and less 
likely to be processed and integrated into consumers memory than the pictorial information. 
When the false picture and words appeared together, however, they formed a stronger memory 
trace, influencing both implicit and explicit tests of memory. Having both modalities of 
misinformation may have made the false information seem more plausible.). 
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improve memory for information compared to words alone.161 
Beyond recognition, pictures increase the consumers sense of 
familiarity,162 which as Laura Bradford has explained in detail, is 
a key determinant of brand power.163 Rich imagery can improve 
positive attitudes towards products and brands; the mechanisms 
for this are debated in the marketing literature, but the effect is 
well-established.164  
Indeed, ad images can even alter consumers memories.165 
Pictures are more likely than words to convince us that weve 
                                            
 161. See, e.g., Terry L. Childers & Michael J. Houston, Conditions for a Picture-
Superiority Effect on Consumer Memory, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 643, 652 (1984) (finding 
that delayed recall of pictorial ads was stronger than verbal-only ads); Julie A. Edell, 
Nonverbal Effects in Ads: A Review and Synthesis, in NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN 
ADVERTISING, supra note 144, at 11, 13 (stating that research shows that pictorial 
stimuli frequently were remembered better than were their verbal equivalents); Kathy A. 
Lutz & Richard J. Lutz, Effects of Interactive Imagery on Learning: Application to 
Advertising, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 493, 497 (1977) (suggesting that interactive images 
that create an association between ad elements are more memorable than a mere picture); 
John T. E. Richardson, Concreteness, Imagery, and Semantic Categorization, 4 J. MENTAL 
IMAGERY 51, 56 (1980) (stating that abstract words that have multiple dictionary meanings are 
generally more difficult to recall); Dolf Zillmann, Silvia Knobloch & Hong-Sik Yu, Effects of 
Photographs on the Selective Reading of News Reports, 3 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 301, 321 (2001) 
(finding that the presence of photos substantially increased attention to, and information 
acquired from, the accompanying text, arguably because of greater emotional resonance). 
 162. Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 9, 11 (citing Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The 
Effect of Verbal and Pictorial Advertising Stimuli on Aesthetic, Utilitarian and 
Familiarity Perceptions, 15 J. ADVERT. 27, 33 (1986)). 
 163. Bradford, supra note 13, at 123435, 125557; see also Scott A. Hawkins & Stephen 
J. Hoch, Low-Involvement Learning: Memory Without Evaluation, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 
212, 223 (1992) (describing a link between a consumers exposure and familiarity with a 
product and their level of belief in that product); Scott A. Hawkins, Stephen J. Hoch & Joan 
Meyers-Levy, Low-Involvement Learning: Repetition and Coherence in Familiarity and 
Belief, 11 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2001) (explaining that participants of an 
experiment indicated a higher belief rating in a message when they were repeatedly 
exposed to that message). 
 164. See, e.g., Babin & Burns, supra note 32, at 3334 (suggesting that the positive 
nature of consumer ads positively affects the consumer); Alvin C. Burns, Abhijit 
Biswas & Laurie A. Babin, The Operation of Visual Imagery as a Mediator of Advertising 
Effects, 22 J. ADVERT. 71, 83 (1993) (finding a link between a consumers attitude toward 
an ad and the vividness of the image); H. Rao Unnava, Sanjeev Agarwal & Curtis P. 
Haugtvedt, Interactive Effects of Presentation Modality and Message-Generated Imagery 
on Recall of Advertising Information, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 81, 82 (1996) (describing 
several ways in which imagery affects attitude). 
 165. See Priyali Rajagopal & Nicole Votolato Montgomery, I Imagine, I Experience, I 
Like: The False Experience Effect, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 578, 578, 586 (2011). Rajagopal 
and Montgomery tested low-imagery print ads (product logo plus relatively abstract copy) 
versus high-imagery print ads (photo of product being enjoyed plus relatively elaborate 
copy) and found that the latter led more people to believe, when later asked, that they had 
actually experienced the product. The effect was stronger when the test product was 
supposedly a brand extension of a familiar brand than when the test was an entirely 
made-up brand. The authors discuss imagery as a characteristic of text that leads 
readers to create mental images for themselves, but the example ads included in the 
paper make clear that the high-imagery ads included pictures as well as text. Id. 
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personally experienced a situation depicted in an ad, whereas 
people detect more discrepancies in ads depicting historical 
impossibilities in words.166 And when consumers do have 
experience with a product, pictures can change what consumers 
think that experience was: when consumers ate a chocolate bar 
with a green wrapper, and then were exposed to an ad showing 
the bar in a blue wrapper, they remembered the bar they ate as 
having a blue or greenish-blue wrapper.167 The power of such 
false memories is striking: 
[F]alse beliefs about past events that arise through exposure to 
[high-imagery] advertising may produce attitudes that are as 
strong as actual product experience. This finding is important 
because stronger attitudes have been shown to be more 
accessible in memory, more predictive of behavior, more 
resistant to counter persuasion, and more persistent over time. 
Further, research has demonstrated that strong positive 
attitudes increase the likelihood that consumers will include 
the brand in their consideration sets and subsequently 
purchase the brand.168 
You might think that more central aspects of a consumption 
experience would not be subject to ad-based alteration, but youd 
be wrong. Many consumer choices are based on general 
attitudesincluding favorable attitudes towards a brand and its 
imagery.169 Its therefore possible to use ads to change memories 
of central features of a product. As noted in Part II.C, consumers 
simply have trouble distinguishing between ads and actual 
experience as the source of imagery.170 
It is important to remember, however, that imagery can 
often be self-generated in response to evocative words.171 These 
results do not suggest an absolute divide between words and 
images. In addition, there are plenty of limits on what ads can do, 
with substantial individual variation as well as context-specific 
effects on memory for true versus false experiences.172  
                                            
 166. See Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 1314 (finding, among other things, 
that people shown word-based ads were less likely to develop false memories about a 
childhood experience at Disney World than a person shown an image-based ad). 
 167. Braun & Loftus, supra note 84, at 57177. 
 168. Rajagopal & Montgomery, supra note 165, at 589 (citations omitted). 
 169. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
137, 160 (2010). 
 170. Arun Lakshmanan & H. Shanker Krishnan, How Does Imagery in Interactive 
Consumption Lead to False Memory? A Reconstructive Memory Perspective, 19 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 451, 451 (2009). 
 171. See id. at 460 (explaining that a consumers exposure to printed words that 
contradict what that consumer originally believed can result in false memory). 
 172. Id. at 45253, 456. 
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My point is not that pictorial ads brainwash us, but that 
advertisers have powerful tools, images prominent among them, 
for shaping our preferences and even our actual experiences and 
memories. Advertising helps consumers interpret [their] 
experiences. It suggests what should be noticed. It provides cues 
and clues to help consumers understand and appreciate their 
feelings. And in this way it can change the nature of the 
response.173 As another group of researchers concludes:  
One of the unifying aspects of the . . . findings is the 
agreement that consumers are generally unaware of the 
influence advertising has had on the interpretation of their 
experience, whether as a memory or as a perception. This 
means that more traditional self-report measures of 
advertising usage may be grossly underestimating the 
impact of advertising.
174
 
Images in particular are so successful because we dont notice 
how theyre affecting us. 
2. The Relation Between Images and Rational 
Decisionmaking Models. False memories created by ads are 
problematic because, by definition, consumers dont know their 
beliefs about the state of the world are now false. Ads may have 
other powerful effects that consumers dont recognize, with 
implications for both moral and efficiency accounts of advertising 
and its regulation. 
As images gain prominence relative to words, the 
informational content of ads apparently dropsor is replaced by 
new kinds of information detached from any particular product 
function or benefit, so that the products supposed qualities 
(coolness, sexiness, etc.) wouldnt exist if they werent 
advertised.175  Information of the kind a modern advertiser or 
trademark owner wants to convey may be best conveyed in 
images, or images supported by words.176 That is, the advertiser 
is likely to promote a set of vague ideas about a products 
superiority that the consumer will fill in with her own specific 
ideas about the facts, and this process works best with images. 
For the same reasons, image-based ads are consistent with the 
                                            
 173. Wells, supra note 156, at 9. 
 174. Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 20. 
 175. See Hammer, supra note 150, at 44243 (referring to a decrease in the quantity 
of information provided by ads over time, though also arguing that the new ads contain 
powerful and significant messages). 
 176. See id. at 44244, 44950 (explaining that modern advertising messages are 
conveyed in a more emotional, covert manner that results in moral significance to the 
viewer). 
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rise of the brand that spans multiple products, where the brands 
aura or ethos is more important than specific defined functions.177  
Ads whose factual claims require conscious deliberation may 
be more effective when consumers already intend to buywhen 
theyre shopping for a loan, for example. But the kinds of ads we 
see all over, all the time, are more likely to trigger peripheral 
processinga nearly automatic mental reaction involving less 
attention and less logical evaluation.178 Peripheral processing 
does not resemble the careful decisionmaking of the ideal 
consumer of classical economic models. In such peripheral 
processing cases, images of beautiful people consuming the 
product work better than careful arguments.179 
However, even when specific information is present and 
consumers are confronting decisions that would seem to require 
conscious deliberation, the intuitive, effortless perception driven 
by images is extremely powerful. Marianne Bertrand and her 
colleagues tested mailers offering a consumer loan; the offers 
varied in both substance and presentation. A photo of a smiling, 
attractive woman in the bottom right-hand corner of the offer 
produced an increased response rate for men equivalent to 
dropping the monthly interest rate by 200 basis points, or 
approximately 25% of the total rate, a substantial percentage.180 
It may be cliché that pretty people can be used to sell products, 
but the effects of visuals go far beyond using sex to sell. Even 
camera angle can influence consumer perceptions of product 
characteristics. Products seemed relatively strong or potent when 
shot from low, upward-looking angles, and relatively weak and 
inferior when shot from high, downward-looking angles.181 
                                            
 177. See Desai & Waller, supra note 13, at 144345 (explaining that brands create 
product differentiation by linking the brand to consumer values). 
 178. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Whats Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from 
a Consumer Credit Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263, 280 (2010) 
(explaining that peripheral processing may be more affective in ads that require a 
consumers basic intuition). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 26668; see also Naomi Mandel & Eric J. Johnson, When Web Pages 
Influence Choice: Effects of Visual Primes on Experts and Novices, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 
235, 23738 (2002) (showing that background images affect choices in a simulated 
internet shopping task). 
 181. Joan Meyers-Levy & Laura A. Peracchio, Getting an Angle in Advertising: The Effect 
of Camera Angle on Product Evaluations, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 454, 455 (1992). This effect 
emerged in conditions of low involvement, which are common when consumers are 
exposed to ads, and did not happen as much when consumers were engaged in 
extensive information processing. Id. at 45760. But see Laura A. Peracchio & Joan 
Meyers-Levy, Using Stylistic Properties of Ad Pictures to Communicate with 
Consumers, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 29, 38 (2005) (arguing that, in some cases, 
consumers may need to be sensitized by ad copy before stylistic cues of this type 
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Consumers thought they were evaluating the product, but they 
were really evaluating the camera angle. (Thus, the Deere court 
may well have been right about the emotional effects of MTDs 
animated deer. The problem is the unfair advantage Deere gains by 
protecting the emotional resonance of its brand.) 
One use of images is of particular relevance to the regulation of 
factual claims: metaphors, especially visual metaphors, draw 
consumers attention better than straightforward claims. The 
flexibility of the image invites more positive associations.182 The 
predictable variation in consumer reactions doesnt make the image 
meaningless; indeed, it makes it useful. So, for example, an image of 
a laundry detergent juxtaposed with a grenade can convey that the 
product is a powerful stain remover, has explosive cleaning power, 
can attack stains, or even that it is more powerful than the 
competition. This last inference is particularly useful to the 
advertiser, since it couldnt make that explicit claim without being 
subject to a potential false advertising challenge by competitors.183 
Even better for the advertiser, an image-supported inference is 
more persuasive: Consumers are less likely to argue against 
associations they came up with themselves, and more likely to 
remember and act on them.184 
In studies of visual versus verbal claims, consumers took the 
same basic message from ads shown as straightforward claims, 
verbal metaphors, and visual metaphors. Both visual and verbal 
metaphors prompted more positive thoughts about the product, 
though, and visual metaphors beat verbal metaphors both in the 
amount and in the speed of positive reactions; consumers exposed 
to verbal metaphors required prompting from the researchers 
before they gave their positive reactions. The researchers 
concluded that [v]isual metaphors may be more effective at 
                                            
affect perception). 
 182. Barbara J. Phillips, Thinking into It: Consumer Interpretation of Complex 
Advertising Images, 26 J. ADVERT. 77, 79 (1997) ([C]onsumers tend to look for positive 
rather than negative meanings in ads. Pictorial metaphors are likely to be interpreted in 
the same way; because consumers know that the purpose of an ad is to promote a product, 
they may look only for positive or favorable dimensions of similarity between the images 
in an ad.). 
 183. See Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips, Indirect Persuasion in 
Advertising: How Consumers Process Metaphors Presented in Pictures and Words, ASSN 
FOR CONSUMER RES. (2005), http://www.acrwebsite.org/topic.asp?artid=291 (explaining 
that advertisers use metaphors instead of explicit claims in order to avoid illegal claims 
that could mislead consumers). 
 184. Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 182, at 80 (explaining that consumers often 
interpret their own metaphors from an ads visual images); Tushnet, supra note 5, at 
132123 (describing how consumers develop their own beliefs about ads by drawing their 
own inferences). 
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influencing consumers thoughts than verbal metaphors in the 
real world, because busy consumers are not usually prompted to 
think about ads.185 Thus, consumers receive factual claims 
without being aware theyve done so. 
One implication of this evidence is that images are more 
likely to harm consumers autonomy than words are because 
images arent received as truth claims and, therefore, slide under 
viewers defenses, even as they retain persuasive power.186 
Autonomy here assumes conscious choice. Consumers routinely 
deny that theyre influenced by ads or images, yet, the studies 
clearly and consistently show that they are.187 When a consumer 
thinks that an ad element is not relevant to her decision, then we 
can raise autonomy concerns: consumers are deeply misled, in the 
aggregate, about the sources of their decisions. 
If questioned, consumers give explanations for their 
behavior that sound plausible, but are not borne out by the 
evidenceand, of course, we are highly motivated to provide 
such explanations. What self-respecting borrower would believe 
hed accepted a substantially higher interest rate because of a 
womans picture on the loan offer?188 
The conclusion from some critics of modern advertising is 
that truthful, legitimate ads should be almost exclusively 
words.189 American law has, however, taken an alternate 
                                            
 185. McQuarrie & Phillips, supra note 183. 
 186. See Hammer, supra note 150, at 45759 (elaborating on the autonomy concern 
with a number of examples of ways in which visuals can persuade without being noticed 
as arguments, including subliminal messages, messages conveyed by the presence or 
absence of black people in ads, and messages about gender equality conveyed by 
pornography); McQuarrie & Phillips, supra note 183 (The most important implication of 
this study is that advertisers may use metaphors in ads, especially visual metaphors, to 
encourage consumers to think positive thoughts about a product that could not be stated 
outright in a straightforward claim. The fact that these positive thoughts occur as soon as 
consumers view the ad means that it is difficult for consumers to guard themselves 
against these extra positive thoughts.). 
 187. Braun-LaTour et al., supra note 84, at 10; see also Hammer, supra note 150, at 
461 (explaining that because viewers are hardly aware that advertisements convey 
multiple, indirect messages, the viewer has little power to prevent the influence of those 
messages). 
 188. See Hall, supra note 84, at 24 (Rational cognitive processes are not the 
primary drivers of purchase behavior through which advertising operates. They are in 
fact outcomes of a complex process of perception, experience, and memorya process that 
is driven primarily by emotions and feelings.). In tests of recall and tests of what 
messages were communicated by an ad, respondents supply extensive information about 
their reactions to copy, but the scores are only relevant to the rational decisionmaking 
processes supplied by the brains interpreter, not to the actual decision processes that 
drive target audience behavior. Id. at 30. 
 189. See Hammer, supra note 150, at 477 ([L]aw should restrict advertisers to 
information-only advertisements. . . . In addition, my suggestion is that advertisements 
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approach, cabining the regulation of truthfulness so that images 
are only rarely and contradictorily governed. 
B. Law 
In contrast to trademark law, where problems with images can 
roughly be divided into scope (under what circumstances will 
trademark law protect images?) and infringement (when does one 
image so greatly resemble another that infringement or dilution 
takes place?), false advertising law asks one basic question: when is 
an ad false?190 This does require answering questions of scope
identifying claims that are falsifiable, analogous to identifying the 
kinds of signifiers that are protectable as marks. But because of the 
absence of a property claimant on one side of a false advertising 
dispute, scope, or falsifiability, tends to get folded into falsity. As 
this section discusses, figuring out whether an image makes a 
falsifiable claim or is mere puffing has proved difficult. 
One example of a visually misleading ad barred by the 
Lanham Act featured images of two identical gas pumps or 
airline tickets with varying prices accompanied by the slogan 
Which one would you choose? This comparison was literally 
false because it made a claim that, like the gas and the tickets, 
the advertised drug was completely equivalent to the 
competitor.191 The Second Circuit also found that an image of 
Bruce Jenner squeezing an orange directly into a carton, 
accompanied by the phrase pure pasteurized juice as it comes 
from the orange, was literally false because the juice in fact 
                                            
might contain pictures of the product, but no other visual representations. Messages 
which set a non-rational process into motion are visual and should therefore be limited. 
For example, a recommendation of the product by a well liked and popular personality or 
even the mere exhibiting of the product together with such a personality without any 
words, constitute a dissemination of a covert message. On the other hand, a picture of the 
product is informational, which assists consumers in making rational decisions. However, 
only pictures of the product itself should be permitted. Pictures of the product against a 
certain background would allow for messages to be conveyed in a problematic manner and 
should not therefore be permitted. In addition, the law should limit the usage of auditory 
medium for the purpose of conveying messages and influencing people in non-cognitive 
ways. The suggested regulation should prohibit the use of pleasant music in 
advertisements. Furthermore, advertisers should be prohibited from using the voice of 
well known personalities to advertise their products.); Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning 
Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1183 (1999) (questioning the argument by 
some that without vivid imagery, it may be more difficult for tobacco companies to draw 
attention to important hard information). 
 190. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 131827, 134445 (describing the ways in which 
courts evaluate advertisements under false advertising law). 
 191. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 516 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
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first underwent pasteurization and might also have been 
frozen.192 
193 
Replicating the confidence found in many trademark cases, 
courts often proceed with complete certainty that (certain) images 
speak clearly. In one case, S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co.,194 
the defendants humorous ads showed two animated goldfish 
suspended in upside-down plastic storage bags, one safe and sound 
in its Glad-Lock bag and the other threatened by a leaky Ziploc.195 
The plaintiffs tests revealed that 37% of Ziploc bags tested under 
similar conditions didnt leak at all, and only 10% leaked at the rate 
depicted in the TV commercials (several drops over the course of a 
15- or 30-second ad).196 The court thus found the ads false, including 
print ads that did not show any leakage rate because they only 
showed a drop of water forming from the Ziploc.197 Because the 
Ziploc bag in each ad was leaking, the court of appeals found a false 
representation that upside-down Ziploc bags filled with water 
always leak.198 This is a leapthe image itself, being a static image 
of a single bag, could not make any representation about frequency 
of leaks. The court made similar findings about a revised television 
ad that, in its judgment, by not mentioning leakage rates or risks, 
but simply presenting an image of a drop forming and falling, was 
explicitly false about those rates and risks.199 As far as the courts 
                                            
 192. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods. Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 318 (2d Cir. 1982), 
abrogated on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized in Johnson & Johnson 
v. GAC Intl, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 193. Excerpt from Tropicana ad, MCA Advertising (on file with author). 
 194. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 195. Id. at 234. 
 196. Id. at 235. 
 197. Id. at 239. 
 198. Id. at 240. 
 199. Id. at 237, 239; S.C. Johnson & Son v. Clorox, Co., No. 99 CIV. 11079 (TPG), 2000 
WL 423534, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000) (There is nothing shown except one image and that 
is an image of a big drop of water falling out of the bag. There is nothing to indicate that this 
kind of leakage occurs in only some particular percentage of bags, and there is nothing to 
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opinion indicates, the plaintiff never rebutted the comparative 
superiority claim at the heart of the ad: Glad bags were less likely 
to leak than Ziploc bags. 
200 
A few years later, the same court reversed a finding that 
certain comparative ads for DirecTVs HDTV service were false. 
According to the court, images showing an incredibly distorted 
image representing cables image quality, compared to that of 
DirecTV, were merely puffing.201  
The classic definition of puffery assumes a claim made in 
words, such as the best ever!202 Puffery is vague and exaggerated, 
or subjective and nonfalsifiable, and is, therefore, nonactionable 
because no reasonable consumer would rely on it.203 In theory, 
puffery cannot distort consumer decisions, while factual claims can. 
The Second Circuit set aside prior definitions of puffery in order to 
create a new rule for images.204 Images, unlike words, cannot be 
                                            
indicate the degree of risk of such leakage. There is only one image, and that is of a big drop 
falling out.). The court refused to treat the ad as occurring in real time. See id. (explaining 
that no evidence was provided to indicate the rate at which the bags leaked). 
 200. Ad on file with author. 
 201. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 15960 (2d Cir. 2007), 
abrogated on other grounds by EBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 202. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 
1400 (2006) (explaining that puffery is conclusively presumed not to mislead consumers). 
 203. Id. at 1397; Owen Weaver, Everything You Will Ever Want To Know About 
Puffery and How the Second Circuit Wrongly Applied It in Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. 
DIRECTV, Inc., 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 357, 363 (2009). 
 204. See Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 15960 (recognizing definitions of puffery as 
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vague or broad, are generally specific and measurable, and can 
therefore be proven either true or false.205 Images, in this account, 
once again have a closer connection to the truth or reality of the 
world than words do.206 This conclusion is particularly notable 
because the court had so recently found that cartoon fishwhich 
indisputably did not existconveyed a false message.207 
Nonetheless, because images were supposedly so specific and 
measurable, under the standard definitions they could not be 
puffery. But the Second Circuit was convinced that some images, 
including the ones before it, needed to be defined as 
nonactionable puffery. A visual depiction of a product can be so 
grossly exaggerated that no reasonable buyer would take it at 
face value.208 Its unreality, its defiance of ordinary rules of 
representation, would simply be apparent. In the case at bar, no 
reasonable consumer could mistake the defendants heavily 
pixilated image for a real representation about cables image 
quality. The court, relying on its own assessment of the image, 
therefore reversed the district courts grant of injunctive relief as 
to the ads featuring these images.209 
                                            
[s]ubjective claims about products, which cannot be proven either true or false and an 
exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad, vague, and commendatory language 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 205. Id. (citations omitted); see also Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 
228 F.3d 24, 3738 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that there is a fundamental difference between 
a slogan on a can label that communicates its meaning to consumers solely through the printed 
text, and a tag line shown on the screen at the end of a television commercial that 
communicates its message to consumers through a combination of audio-visual and textual 
media, but not explaining what that fundamental difference was such that, as the court 
concluded, the former could not be false but the latter could be). 
 206. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 67, 9. 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 194203. 
 208. Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 159. 
 209. Id. at 16061. 
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But why would consumers have such defined expectations 
about a then-new technology? What was different about images 
that made them so incredible that reasonable consumers 
wouldnt rely on themfor that is what the puffery designation 
meansas opposed to words accusing cable of poor quality, as to 
which the court upheld the district courts injunction?210 The 
Second Circuits new rule ensured differential treatment of words 
and images but provided little guidance for the next set of images 
to come along. But the court was unconcerned for the resulting 
uncertainty, perhaps because of the underlying assumption that 
all viewers will generally interpret a picture in the same way, 
allowing the court to confidently slot the category of the 
meaningless image (puffery) alongside the category of the 
exaggerated but especially persuasive image (falsity).211 
As with trademark, verbal overshadowing is likely to be a 
problem in such cases, helping to account for the unpredictable 
classification of images as puffery or as falsifiable. The research 
on verbal overshadowing suggests that how people talk about an 
ad will affect their perceptions of the ad itself.212 Lanham Act 
false advertising law is particularly vulnerable to this problem 
because it has adopted an unrealistically rigid distinction 
between false claims and misleading claims.213 False claims may 
be prohibited without extrinsic evidence of consumer reaction, 
                                            
 210. Id. at 154, 158. 
 211. See Weaver, supra note 203, at 372 ([I]t is hard to rationalize why the same 
false statement would have a higher propensity to deceive consumers when expressed 
through words rather than when expressed through images. In essence, DIRECTV used 
two different forms of advertising to convey the same message to consumers that its HD 
picture quality is superior to cables HD picture quality. The Second Circuit found 
DIRECTVs claim to be literally false and deceptive when expressed through words in a 
television commercial, yet when the same message was expressed through an exaggerated 
image the Second Circuit determined that it was unlikely to deceive consumers. This 
decision in effect creates a dichotomy between statements expressed through words and 
statements expressed through images, with the latter avoiding liability under section 
43(a). As a result, advertisers are now encouraged to produce outrageous visual 
advertisements because under that format they can avoid section 43(a) liability. 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 212. This effect of overshadowing is most obvious with nonword-based ads, where the 
medium shift increases the cognitive demands on fact finders trying to think about 
images or sounds, but the research suggests that the same phenomenon may occur even 
with word-based ads because the presentation surrounding those works may prime 
respondents to think in certain ways. See, e.g., H. Shanker Krishnan & Dipankar 
Chakravarti, Memory Measures for Pretesting Advertisements: An Integrative Conceptual 
Framework and a Diagnostic Template, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 1015 (1999) 
(explaining and testing priming effects). 
 213. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 133744 (discussing the rigid distinction courts 
have created between cases of implicit falsity and those of explicit falsity, and the 
problems it has created for plaintiffs). 
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but misleading claims require such evidence, usually in the form 
of an expensive consumer survey.214 In order to figure out 
whether an image is false or only potentially misleading, a court 
has to determine what the image says: it has to put the image 
into words and figure out if theres only one way to understand 
the claim (which makes the claim either true or false) or multiple 
ways (which may make the claim misleading if some of those 
ways are false and if the evidence shows that a substantial 
number of consumers receive a false message).215 
Carrying out this classification process, the verbal 
overshadowing literature suggests, is likely to change a fact 
finders perception of what claims the ad makes, to the detriment 
of the laws goals of protecting consumers in actual purchasing 
decisions.216 Moreover, the step of translating images into words 
is likely to produce multiple alternative wordings, as with the 
stain-grenade example in the previous section, making it 
especially likely that images will be found only potentially 
misleading even when consumers are in fact being deceived.217 
Likewise, ads with specific meanings to reasonable consumers 
may be deemed puffery because some verbal translations of the 
ads are insufficiently specific.218 
At a minimum, courts should go beyond their often 
conflicting intuitions about images and give reasons related to 
                                            
 214. Id. at 132021. 
 215. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., No. 89 CV 3586 (KMW), 1992 WL 
30938, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1992) (accepting survey evidence of deception where images 
interacted with words to make consumers believe that the ad promised more than the 
literal meaning of the words); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 91 Civ. 
5079 (MGC), 1991 WL 221107, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1991) (finding that an ad with 
images of consumers falling asleep in unlikely places after using plaintiffs product was 
ambiguous and converting potential meanings into words). 
 216. See Brandimonte, Schooler & Gabbino, supra note 81, at 91516 (cataloguing 
the various theories of how verbalization interferes with visual perception); McKenna, 
supra note 11, at 1844 (noting that one of trademark laws primary goals is to protect 
consumers from being deceived into buying products they do not want). 
 217. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The 
Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 24546 (describing 
the detached nature of artistic communication); Walvis, supra note 90, at 40308 (discussing 
the design of consumer product and advertising focus groups, revealing that the design of 
the study (respondent selection, the questions asked, how they are phrased, how they are 
posed, in what setting, by whom, and so on) influences the answers obtained from 
respondents, and citing several examples of consumer advertising studies that produced 
responses clearly contrary to real-world reactions). 
 218. See Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 39194 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that although 93% of consumers surveyed thought the phrase 
Americas Favorite Pasta meant that the brand in question was Americas number one 
brand and 50% of consumers thought the phrase meant that the brand was a national 
brand, the phrase was insufficiently specific and unquantifiable so as to constitute 
puffery). 
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the specific images at issue, as well as reasons related to visual 
perception if those reasons are founded in actual evidence. 
Courts should hesitate to find that images are puffery given how 
much we know about images power to persuade without 
consumers conscious awareness that they believe or are affected 
by the images. An obvious animation may be understood as 
humorous, especially if it features Homer Simpson or the like,219 
but it also can easily be understood by consumers to represent 
something real. People are used to seeing stylized 
representations of real phenomena in ads and elsewhere, 
especially when processes (cell growth, pharmaceutical activity, 
tornado movement, and so on) cant be seen with the unaided 
eye.220 When advertisers deliberately choose images, they intend 
to convey some meaning, and that meaning may often be factual. 
If courts start to take images more seriously as conveyors of 
meaning, they can build up a body of case law that will provide 
more useful guidance.221 
C. Cigarettes and Environmental Marketing: Case Studies of 
Image-Based Regulation 
The importance of images to advertising law can be seen in 
the example of cigarettes, where it is increasingly evident that 
regulating the words used by cigarette manufacturers is 
insufficient to constrain misleading messages sent by various 
cigarette brands. Brand messagesconveyed by colors, design, 
font, and brand nameshave powerful influences on consumers 
sensory experiences of cigarettes.222 More specifically, cigarette 
manufacturers use light colors and white space in package design 
                                            
 219. See Phillips, supra note 182, at 78 (Advertising knowledge may enable 
consumers to process information in genre-specific ways. For example, implicatures 
drawn from a print ad may differ from those suggested by a painting or a cartoon. 
(citations omitted)). 
 220. See, e.g., Schick Mfg., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 273, 28586 (D. Conn. 
2005) (Clearly, a cartoon will not exactly depict a real-life situation, here, e.g., the actual 
uneven surface of a hair or the details of a hair plug. However, a party may not distort an 
inherent quality of its product in either graphics or animation. Gillette acknowledges that 
the magnitude of beard hair extension in the animation is false. The court finds, 
therefore, that any claims with respect to changes in angle and the animated portion of 
Gillettes current advertisement are literally false.); LORRAINE DASTON & PETER 
GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 34855 (2007) (discussing situations in which various types of 
representation are understood to represent reality, including images that unaided human 
eyes could not see). 
 221. See Jessica Silbey, Cross Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION 
GENDER & CLASS 17, 22, 4546 (2008) (setting out standard questions lawyers and courts 
could ask about film as evidence). 
 222. Melanie Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack As Image: New Evidence from 
Tobacco Industry Documents, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i73, i75 (2002). 
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to make their cigarettes seem healthier.223 This sensation 
transfer or halo effect of product packaging is an important 
factor in making cigarettes seem lower in tar.224 Pictures of a 
filter also increase the illusion of lower tar and lower health 
risks.225 Smokers are more likely than nonsmokers to respond to 
such graphic cues, and smokers of light or mild brands are even 
more likely to do so, perhaps as a way of reducing cognitive 
dissonance: smoking light cigarettes seems less dangerous.226 
While many countries ban the terms light, mild, and low tar 
as misleading, manufacturers can convey the same messages 
using white and other light colors.227 In essence, color makes 
misleading factual representations (what in trademark would be 
called secondary meaning, though here that meaning is not source-
related but content-related).228 
Although cigarette trade dress does not make factual claims 
in words, it does make claims that consumers interpret as factual 
and, thus, constitutes misleading commercial speech under U.S. 
law.229 Unfortunately, cigarette companies have successfully 
                                            
 223. Sam F. Halabi, The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: 
Regulatory Successes and Market Failures, UPDATE, May/June 2011, at 16, 1819; see 
David Hammond & Carla Parkinson, The Impact of Cigarette Package Design on 
Perceptions of Risk, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH 345, 346, 349 (2009) (stating that lighter shades 
and white represent less tar, smoother taste, and lower health risk); Wakefield et al., 
supra note 222, at i76 (reporting that [c]ompanies discovered that lighter colours on the 
pack appeared to promote perceptions of lower cigarette strength and that consumers 
rated identical cigarettes as milder in a blue pack and stronger and harsher in a red 
pack); TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, EUROPEAN COMMN, EUROBAROMETER 72.3: TOBACCO 8788 
(2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/docs/ebs332_en.pdf (As with the 
specific cigarette taste, one in ten people believe that the colour of the cigarette pack is 
indicative of one brand being less harmful than another.). 
 224. Wakefield et al., supra note 222, at i75i77; see also Hammond & Parkinson, 
supra note 223, at 346 (Several internal industry studies have demonstrated that the 
color and design of the package are effective to the point where they influence sensory 
perceptions from smoking a cigarette . . . .). 
 225. Hammond & Parkinson, supra note 223, at 350. 
 226. Id. at 35051. 
 227. Id. at 351; Ben Goldacre, Why Cigarette Packs Matter, BAD SCI. (March 12, 
2011), http://www.badscience.net/2011/03/why-cigarette-packs-matter/. 
 228. Furthermore, without mandatory counterimaging, cigarette manufacturers can 
circumvent advertising bans, since cigarette packs themselves can be used to make 
displays, pyramids, patterns and other designs to attract the eye. Wakefield et al., supra 
note 222, at i78. 
 229. Federal law defines prohibited false advertising as an advertisement, other 
than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2006). 
[I]n determining whether any advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken 
into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by 
statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination thereof, but also the 
extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the light of 
such representations . . . .  
Id. It seems that many elements of cigarette trade dress fit squarely within this definition. 
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challenged color- and image-related bans using the First 
Amendment. In Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 
the court concluded that such bans were not narrowly tailored to 
the goal of reducing youth smoking.230 This is in part a failure to 
offer the right evidence: color and images are misleading to 
adults as well, and U.S. regulators should emphasize that, if 
trade dress is speech, it is deceptive speech. 
Similar problems of misleading without words can arise with 
environmentally friendly claims. Though the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has recognized that various types of green 
marketing can convey false or misleading messages,231 it has 
focused on words, though green imagery may be equally or even 
more vague in claiming a general environmental benefit a 
product cant actually deliver. Thus, while the FTC discourages 
the unqualified use of the terms green or environmentally 
friendly because it is unlikely that a product is actually 
environmentally friendly across the wide array of axes that 
consumers expect from such a general term,232 the FTC has not 
extended that default condemnation to the use of the color green or 
other environmental symbols. Though the FTC provides extensive 
explanations and examples of the appropriate use of specific words, 
it provides very little with respect to regulating images.233  
Likewise, Californias Environmental Marketing Claims Act 
(EMCA) regulates a number of specific environmentally 
friendly phrases, then uses the phrase any other like term to 
describe unenumerated but still regulated claims.234 Thus, if an 
                                            
 230. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 52627 
(W.D. Ky. 2010). 
 231. 16 C.F.R. § 260.2(a) (2011) (stating that the Green Guides apply to 
environmental claims whether asserted directly or by implication, through words, 
symbols, emblems, logos, depictions, product brand names, or through any other means); 
see also Reporter Resources: The FTCs Green Guides, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/greengds.shtm (calling 16 C.F.R. § 260 the Green 
Guides) (last modified June 24, 2011). 
 232. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (2011) (Unqualified general claims of environmental 
benefit are difficult to interpret, and depending on their context, may convey a wide range 
of meanings to consumers. In many cases, such claims may convey that the product, 
package or service has specific and far-reaching environmental benefits. . . . [E]very 
express and material implied claim that the general assertion conveys to reasonable 
consumers about an objective quality, feature or attribute of a product or service must be 
substantiated. Unless this substantiation duty can be met, broad environmental claims 
should either be avoided or qualified, as necessary, to prevent deception about the specific 
nature of the environmental benefit being asserted.). 
 233. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) & ex. 5 (2011) (warning that an environmental seal, 
either in the form of a globe icon, or a globe icon with only the text Earth Smart around 
it is likely to make a general environmental benefit claim). 
 234. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 1758017581 (West 2008). 
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image conveys the same environmentally friendly message to 
consumers as one of the regulated phrases, the advertiser need 
not comply with EMCAs extensive provisions for requiring 
documentation of the substantiation for the environmental 
claims and for any offsetting environmental harms caused by the 
product.235 This allows advertisers a chance to arbitrage their 
claims: converting to images avoids much troublesome 
regulation.236 
With cigarettes, regulators are beginning to propose 
image-based interventions of their own. The World Health 
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control has 
recommended that half or more of a pack be covered with graphic 
warnings.237 The Food and Drug Administration has recently 
released its proposed image warnings showing various health 
consequences of smoking.238 On-package graphics, now in use in 
Canada, may be the best way to combat the visual appeal of the 
                                            
 235. Section 17580 provides as follows:  
(a) Any person who represents in advertising or on the label or container of a 
consumer good that the consumer good that it manufactures or distributes is not 
harmful to, or is beneficial to, the natural environment, through the use of such 
terms as environmental choice, ecologically friendly, earth friendly, 
environmentally friendly, ecologically sound, environmentally sound, 
environmentally safe, ecologically safe, environmentally lite, green product, or 
any other like term, shall maintain in written form in its records the following 
information and documentation supporting the validity of the representation: 
(1) The reasons why the person believes the representation to be true. 
(2) Any significant adverse environmental impacts directly associated with 
the production, distribution, use, and disposal of the consumer good. 
(3) Any measures that are taken by the person to reduce the environmental 
impacts directly associated with the production, distribution, and disposal of 
the consumer good. 
(4) Violations of any federal, state, or local permits directly associated with 
the production or distribution of the consumer good. 
(5) Whether or not, if applicable, the consumer good conforms with the 
uniform standards contained in the Federal Trade Commission Guidelines 
for Environmental Marketing Claims for the use of the terms recycled, 
recyclable, biodegradable, photodegradable, or ozone friendly. 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17580(a)(1)(5) (West 2008). Section 17580.5 adds a ban on 
any untruthful, deceptive, or misleading environmental marketing claim, whether 
explicit or implied, so images would be covered there if shown to be false or misleading, 
but without the specific documentation requirements in the previous section. CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5(a) (West 2008). 
 236. See Hill v. Roll Intl Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(refusing to interpret the image of a green drop on a bottle of water as a general 
environmental benefit claim). 
 237. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 53 
(2011), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241501316_eng.pdf.  
 238. See Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2011).  
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cigarette pack itself.239 Using colors and graphics to guide 
consumers understandings of nutrition labels has proved more 
effective than words alone,240 providing reason to hope for greater 
success with cigarettes as well. 
Unfortunately, however, a district court recently ruled the 
FDAs proposed requirement of including warning images on 
cigarette packs unconstitutional, holding among other things that 
the images were so graphic that they exploited fear rather than 
conveying rational risk information the way words do.241 Once 
again, judicial treatment of images favors the advertiser over 
challengers, just as in Deere and in many false advertising cases. 
Marlboro can exploit our emotions, but Uncle Sam cant, even 
though emotions are critical to judgment, not opposed to it.242 
Ironically, the judge who struck down the regulation was 
impassionedusing multiple exclamation points in the opinion, 
evenbut apparently didnt think that his own emotions interfered 
with his reasoning.243 
M. Ryan Calo has offered a more general, positive regulatory 
lesson based on what we know about how images work 
differently than words.244 Given that regulators often want 
consumers to know more informationindeed, given that in the 
United States the First Amendment may prevent any other 
remedy for certain kinds of misleading ad contentwe should 
consider making required disclosures visual or otherwise 
visceral, rather than textual. Word-based, and often quite wordy, 
disclosures tend to work very badly. Consumers simply ignore or 
                                            
 239. See Halabi, supra note 223, at 18 (The pictoral warnings proposed by the FDA 
provide arguably the most important contribution to consumer decision-making); 
Wakefield et al., supra note 222, at i78 (discussing the unappealing images now used on 
cigarette packs in Canada). 
 240. See, e.g., CAROLYN L. ENGELHARD, ARTHUR GARSON, JR. & STAN DORN, REDUCING 
OBESITY: POLICY STRATEGIES FROM THE TOBACCO WARS 3438 (2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411926_reducing_obesity.pdf; Bridget Kelly et al., 
Consumer Testing of the Acceptability and Effectiveness of Front-of-Pack Food Labeling 
Systems for the Australian Grocery Market, 24 HEALTH PROMOTION INTL 120, 125 (2009), 
available at http://www.foodpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/australia_label_09.pdf (finding 
that consumers were five times as likely to correctly identify healthy food when they were 
exposed to green, yellow, and red traffic light labels, rather than black and white, nongraphic 
numerical boxes). 
 241. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL), 2011 WL 5307391, at *5
6 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011) (condemning emotion-provoking images and the subjective 
vision of the horrors of tobacco addiction). 
 242. See generally David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of 
Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 
1275 (clarifying legal thinking about emotion in decisionmaking). 
 243. See R.J. Reynolds, 2011 WL 5307391, at *7, *8 n.28. 
 244. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript). 
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misunderstand them.245 Nonverbal disclosures could do a better 
job. For example, since images of eyes or human-like avatars 
make people feel like theyre being observed, privacy disclosures 
might be much more noticeable and effective if conveyed via such 
methods.246 Even changes in the formality and color of websites 
can noticeably change behavior related to disclosure of private 
information.247 If we want people to worry about what they are 
disclosing online, then interventions into format may be far more 
effective than requirements that websites offer detailed privacy 
policies.248 In trademark, similarly, a better understanding of 
image-based disclaimers would build a firmer foundation for 
protecting products that imitate a national brands trade dress. A 
house brands distinctive logo (such as that of Safeway or Target) 
is likely to cue consumers to notice the differences between the 
products, averting confusion. 
IV. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
The most sweeping conclusion I am willing to reach is that 
the field of case law under the Lanham Act is very far from 
anything approaching coherence with respect to its treatment of 
images. One strand of trademark law prioritizes words, 
reluctantly allowing images along for the ride. This can be seen 
in courts attempts to reduce trade dress to words, along with the 
PTOs requirement that all trademarks be converted into words 
for purposes of classification.249 In this version of trademark, 
                                            
 245. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 67173, 71113 (2011) (revealing that consumers usually ignore 
boilerplate license agreements, infrequently consult food nutrition labels, and often do not 
understand disclosures due to illiteracy or lack of knowledge). 
 246. See Calo, supra note 244 (manuscript at 3031) (It turns out we are hardwired 
to react to anthropomorphic design as though a person were really there. We know 
intellectually that what we are seeing is not a real person, but for many purposes our 
brains are incapable of shutting off these psychological reactions to the perceived presence 
of another. Among these reactions is the feeling of being observed and evaluated. In one 
study, people paid more often for coffee on the honor system when a picture of a pair of eyes 
was present. In another, people skipped sensitive questions on an online questionnaire and 
engaged in more self-promotion when the interface appeared like a person. (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 247. See id. (manuscript at 39) (stating that a study at Carnegie Mellon found that 
subjects responded to personal questions more honestly where the interface was casual 
than in the control or formal condition). 
 248. See id. (manuscript at 3132). 
 249. Under European law, trademarks must be described in ways that can be 
textually represented, even if that means using Pantone color numbers or musical 
notation rather than a true copy of the mark as it exists in the market. OFFICE FOR 
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT. (TRADE MARKS AND DESIGNS), GUIDELINES 
CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL 
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words are just more likely to work as trademarks, or at least 
more likely to be amenable to legal classification and governance. 
To the extent that the latter motivation is the true justification, 
courts should admit as much and stop saying unproven (and 
often disproven) things about how consumers think. 
Another strand elevates the power of the image over other 
forms of communicationboth as trademarks and in deciding 
trademark cases. Images are immediately intelligible and easily 
judged, as Judge Posner instructs lawyers. We know it when we 
see it and we all see the same thing. 
Meanwhile, in false advertising law, the difficulty of pinning 
down an images meaning in order to determine whether that 
image makes a false claim has also led courts to state, rather 
than explain, their conclusions. Each field seems to reach its own 
set of compromises, picking and choosing from attitudes towards 
visual representation without harmonizing types of cases or 
rationales. It may well be that ideas about fair competition and 
predictability can explain the differences, but that work has yet 
to be done in a convincing way. 
Images can make claims, just as words do. Among other 
things, this means that advertising images can be false or 
misleading, and, therefore, subject to regulation. Courts 
understand that images regularly make meanings specific 
enough to mislead in trademark law; they should carry that 
conclusion over to advertising law generally. This might also 
allow more effective regulation on an industry-wide basis: using 
images to improve disclosure requirements or to avoid types of 
communications that are particularly likely to deceive. Truly 
integrating images into our advertising law would allow 
regulation to leverage the power of images and not just fight a 
rearguard action against that power. 
 
                                            
MARKET 10 (2008), available at http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/CTM/ 
guidelines/examination_en.pdf; see also Bartow, supra note 49, at 265 (arguing that 
words, which are easily transmitted to others, are better suited to serving as 
simultaneously effective and distinctive trademarks than colors or sounds). Its probably 
not accidental that Europes more aggressive requirements coincide with the preeminence 
European trademark law gives to registration over use; words are easier to catalog and 
search than nonverbal marks. 
